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During	  World	  War	  II,	  Hitler	  employed	  a	  lot	  of	  tactical	  rhetoric	  and	  the	  use	  of	  this	  rhetoric	  is	  often	  noted	  as	  being	  extraordinarily	  persuasive,	  but	  I	  wanted	  to	  know	  if	  there	  is	  rhetorical	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  this	  was	  the	  case.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  this,	  I	  looked	  at	  five	  of	  Hitler’s	  most	  prominent	  rhetorical	  topoi	  and	  examined	  the	  end-­‐of-­‐war/post-­‐war	  rhetoric	  of	  German	  generals	  in	  both	  private	  and	  public	  settings	  for	  evidence	  of	  the	  repetition	  of	  these	  topoi	  in	  their	  deliberations.	  By	  looking	  at	  this	  rhetorical	  evidence	  more	  closely	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  answer	  to	  whether	  Hitler	  was	  truly	  persuasive	  was	  maybe.	  The	  topoi	  that	  are	  found	  in	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  both	  the	  public	  and	  private	  generals	  and	  in	  Hitler	  are	  those	  with	  a	  basis	  in	  the	  German	  culture,	  thus	  while	  this	  repetition	  of	  topoi	  may	  be	  a	  result	  of	  Hitler’s	  rhetorical	  power,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  this	  power	  was	  overstated	  and	  that	  what	  looks	  like	  persuasion	  is	  rather	  the	  weaponization	  of	  these	  beliefs	  by	  Hitler.	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INTRODUCTION	  
In	  the	  spring	  of	  2016,	  I	  took	  a	  class	  based	  in	  the	  history	  of	  rhetoric	  and	  tellingly	  entitled	  Deliberating	  War.	  We	  discussed,	  broadly,	  how	  people	  throughout	  history	  debated	  the	  many	  issues	  that	  surround	  war,	  and	  how	  people	  had	  answered	  questions	  such	  as	  how	  to	  convince	  people	  of	  the	  worth	  of	  a	  war,	  how	  to	  keep	  nations	  from	  going	  to	  war,	  and	  what	  strategies	  to	  employ	  in	  the	  war.	  These	  questions,	  and	  more,	  were	  discussed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  two	  wars	  in	  particular:	  the	  Peloponnesian	  War	  and	  World	  War	  II.	  This	  more	  recent	  war	  immediately	  transfixed	  me.	  In	  the	  final	  paper	  for	  the	  class,	  I	  explored	  how	  Hitler’s	  generals	  could	  have	  persuaded	  him,	  and	  I	  found	  it	  almost	  impossible	  to	  find	  a	  way.	  So	  what	  of	  the	  opposite?	  Did	  Hitler	  persuade	  his	  generals?	  Many	  people	  say	  yes.	  William	  Shirer,	  an	  allied	  reporter,	  described	  hearing	  Hitler	  speak	  and	  being	  convinced	  in	  the	  moment	  of	  ideas	  he	  did	  not	  truly	  believe	  (“The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  The	  Third	  Reich:	  A	  History	  of	  Nazi	  Germany”).	  Hitler	  is	  often	  described	  as	  a	  master	  rhetorician	  and	  almost	  hypnotic	  speaker.	  But	  is	  this	  persuasion	  real	  or	  only	  apparent?	  This	  is	  where	  my	  research	  began.	  In	  order	  to	  explore	  this	  question	  I	  delve	  into	  two	  collections	  of	  transcripts.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  transcripts	  is	  that	  of	  the	  private	  conversations	  that	  occurred	  between	  high-­‐ranking	  German	  generals,	  many	  of	  whom	  had	  been	  stationed	  and	  captured	  in	  Northern	  Africa,	  who	  were	  being	  held	  as	  prisoners	  of	  war	  at	  an	  estate	  just	  outside	  of	  London	  called	  Trent	  Park	  (Neitzel	  13-­‐29).	  These	  generals	  were	  essentially	  given	  free	  rein	  of	  the	  estate,	  and	  left	  to	  mingle	  amongst	  themselves,	  but	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they	  were	  constantly	  under	  careful	  surveillance	  and	  unknowingly	  manipulated	  into	  expressing	  more	  information	  through	  the	  use	  of	  stool	  pigeons,	  an	  undercover	  interpreter	  named	  Lord	  Aberfeldy,	  and	  the	  placement	  of	  officers	  from	  different	  branches	  of	  the	  German	  military	  together	  to	  garner	  more	  detailed	  explanations	  (Neitzel,	  20-­‐21).	  Whenever	  a	  topic	  of	  interest	  was	  brought	  up	  by	  the	  generals	  and	  identified	  as	  potentially	  significant	  by	  those	  monitoring	  the	  conversations	  in	  secret,	  the	  gramophone	  recording	  would	  be	  started	  and	  could	  record	  up	  to	  seven	  minutes	  of	  conversation.	  The	  other	  text	  I	  explore	  for	  evidence	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  Hitler’s	  topoi	  is	  that	  of	  Eichmann	  Interrogated:	  Transcripts	  from	  the	  Archives	  of	  the	  Israeli	  Police.	  Adolf	  Eichmann	  was	  one	  of	  the	  major	  organizers	  of	  the	  Holocaust	  and	  after	  the	  war	  was	  over,	  he	  fled	  to	  Argentina	  to	  avoid	  punishment	  for	  war	  crimes	  (Von	  Lang	  v-­‐xxii).	  However,	  on	  May	  23,	  1960,	  Eichmann	  was	  arrested	  and	  taken	  to	  be	  tried	  in	  Israel	  (Von	  Lang	  xiii,	  xiv).	  A	  day	  later,	  Avner	  W.	  Less,	  a	  German	  Jew	  and	  Israeli	  police	  officer,	  was	  asked	  to	  help	  create	  the	  case	  against	  Eichmann	  through	  a	  months-­‐long	  interrogation.	  It	  is	  the	  transcripts	  of	  these	  interrogations	  that	  I	  will	  also	  be	  searching	  for	  rhetorical	  evidence	  of	  Hitler’s	  persuasion.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  whether	  we	  see	  evidence	  of	  a	  correlation	  between	  the	  proposed	  rhetoric	  of	  Hitler	  and	  the	  end-­‐of-­‐war/post-­‐war	  rhetoric	  of	  his	  generals,	  we	  will	  not	  be	  making	  any	  sort	  of	  claim	  regarding	  the	  intentionalist	  theory	  of	  the	  Holocaust.	  Rather	  the	  data	  will	  suggest	  whether	  or	  not	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  correlated	  with	  a	  short-­‐term	  persuasion	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  rhetoric	  of	  his	  generals.	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   One	  reason	  I	  chose	  these	  two	  specific	  texts	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  both	  deal	  with	  end-­‐of-­‐war/post-­‐war	  rhetoric.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  evidence	  shown	  in	  this	  paper	  and	  the	  conclusions	  they	  suggest	  do	  not	  serve	  as	  commentary	  on	  the	  true	  beliefs	  and	  motives	  of	  these	  generals	  and	  others	  during	  the	  war	  itself,	  but	  rather	  on	  the	  choices	  they	  made	  in	  trying	  to	  create	  their	  alabis.	  The	  transcripts	  in	  Tapping	  Hitler’s	  
Generals	  occur	  almost	  entirely	  after	  what	  is	  often	  deemed	  the	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  war:	  Stalingrad	  (Neitzel)	  .	  This	  means	  that	  the	  generals	  that	  are	  speaking	  have	  a	  fairly	  universal	  belief	  that	  Germany	  is	  going	  to	  lose	  the	  war.	  Thus	  they	  come	  at	  these	  deliberations	  from	  a	  similar	  but	  less	  distant	  perspective	  than	  that	  of	  Eichmann.	  Eichmann’s	  interrogation	  occurred	  in	  late	  May	  of	  1960,	  well	  after	  the	  war	  had	  ended,	  but	  he	  is	  also	  attempting	  to	  create	  an	  alibi	  (Von	  Lang).	  Thus,	  by	  looking	  at	  these	  two	  texts,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  explore	  evidence	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  on	  the	  explanative	  reasoning	  of	  his	  generals.	  	   The	  second	  reason	  I	  chose	  to	  look	  at	  these	  two	  specific	  texts	  is	  because	  they	  provide	  us	  with,	  not	  only	  a	  variety	  of	  generals	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  situations	  in	  the	  war,	  but	  they	  provide	  us	  with	  two	  sides	  of	  one	  important	  distinction	  that	  could	  potentially	  affect	  the	  replication	  of	  specific	  topoi:	  private	  versus	  public	  deliberations.	  The	  captured	  generals	  are	  unaware	  that	  they	  are	  being	  recorded.	  Their	  guard	  is	  down,	  and	  they	  are	  amongst	  others	  in	  a	  similar	  position	  to	  their	  own.	  This	  sense	  of	  safety	  leads	  to	  less	  self-­‐regulated	  deliberations	  and	  less	  outside	  influence	  of	  other’s	  opinions	  on	  their	  statements.	  These	  Trent	  Park	  generals	  are	  not	  immune	  to	  lying	  because	  of	  their	  situation,	  but	  when	  they	  lie	  it	  is	  much	  more	  likely	  that	  they	  are	  lying	  to	  themselves	  which	  suggests	  some	  sort	  of	  short-­‐term	  persuasion	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rather	  than	  a	  long-­‐term	  convincing.	  Eichmann,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  very	  aware	  that	  every	  word	  he	  speaks	  will	  be	  public	  information	  that	  is	  poured	  over.	  His	  interrogation	  transcripts	  are	  much	  more	  carefully	  worded,	  guarded,	  and	  scripted.	  There	  is	  an	  obvious	  motive	  of	  saving	  his	  own	  life	  within	  Eichmann’s	  deliberations	  in	  the	  pre-­‐trial	  interrogations.	  Whereas	  the	  captured	  generals	  do	  not	  believe	  themselves	  to	  have	  an	  audience	  and	  lack	  as	  strong	  motive	  to	  say	  anything	  other	  than	  what	  they	  feel,	  whether	  historically	  accurate	  or	  not,	  Eichmann	  has	  the	  complete	  opposite.	  What	  he	  says	  will	  determine	  whether	  he	  lives	  or	  dies.	  I	  wish	  to	  know	  whether	  Hitler’s	  rhetorical	  topoi	  were	  persuasive	  enough	  to	  hold	  up	  against	  this	  immense	  added	  pressure,	  and	  	  I	  want	  to	  explore	  whether	  this	  public	  versus	  private	  distinction	  will	  make	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  topoi	  we	  see	  repeated.	  	  	  One	  potential	  concern	  that	  many	  may	  have	  about	  this	  choice	  of	  transcripts	  is	  that	  of	  the	  wide	  variety	  of	  different	  experiences	  of	  the	  war	  between	  each	  of	  the	  captured	  generals	  themselves	  and	  in	  comparison	  to	  Eichmann.	  However,	  if	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  were	  truly	  persuasive,	  we	  should	  see	  repetitions	  of	  what	  Hitler	  was	  attempting	  to	  persuade	  others	  of	  regardless	  of	  their	  experiences.	  Hitler’s	  rhetorical	  influence	  should	  be	  able	  to	  be	  seen	  through	  the	  repetition	  of	  his	  specific	  topoi	  despite	  a	  difference	  in	  what	  these	  topoi	  are	  being	  specifically	  used	  to	  explain.	  In	  essence,	  we	  will	  be	  testing	  a	  list	  a	  topoi	  against	  the	  post-­‐war/late-­‐war	  rhetoric	  of	  these	  generals	  in	  order	  to	  see	  if	  we	  can	  find	  any	  sort	  of	  repetition	  that	  can	  suggest	  a	  correlation	  between	  the	  original	  rhetoric	  of	  Hitler	  and	  that	  of	  his	  generals.	  A	  truly	  persuasive	  and	  pervasive	  message	  should	  span	  across	  most	  of	  Hitler’s	  generals	  and	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  whims	  of	  one’s	  personal	  experiences.	  To	  be	  affected	  by	  shared	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experience	  only	  would	  be	  evidence	  of	  a	  shared	  sense	  of	  truth	  rather	  than	  evidence	  of	  rhetorical	  persuasion.	  It	  is	  expected	  that	  those	  who	  experience	  the	  same	  things	  will	  explain	  them	  similarly,	  but	  for	  those	  who	  experienced	  these	  things	  differently	  to	  speak	  of	  them	  similarly	  suggests	  an	  outside	  influence	  of	  some	  kind.	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  these	  questions	  regarding	  the	  extent	  of	  Hitler’s	  rhetorical	  power,	  we	  must	  first	  determine	  what	  it	  is	  we	  are	  looking	  for.	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HITLER’S	  MOST	  PROMINENT	  TOPOI	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Hitler	  is	  often	  discussed	  as	  a	  “master	  rhetorician.”	  Even	  his	  home	  was	  a	  piece	  of	  rhetoric	  used	  to	  cultivate	  a	  specific	  image	  and	  message	  to	  others,	  and	  we	  know	  from	  the	  historical	  record	  that	  his	  generals	  were	  very	  devoted	  to	  him,	  but	  is	  there	  evidence	  that	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  had	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  how	  Hitler’s	  generals	  rationalized	  their	  actions	  and	  behaviors?	  In	  essence,	  how	  well	  did	  his	  rhetoric	  actually	  work?	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  this	  question,	  we	  must	  analyze	  a	  comparison	  of	  reactions	  and	  rationalizations	  of	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  and	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  those	  who	  may	  have	  been	  affected	  by	  testing	  the	  hypothesized	  topoi	  of	  Hitler	  provided	  to	  us	  by	  O’Shaughnessy	  and	  Kershaw	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  Hitler’s	  generals	  and	  everyday	  citizens	  were	  repeating	  Hitler’s	  words.	  In	  turn,	  we	  hope	  to	  uncover	  evidence	  as	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  Hitler’s	  use	  of	  rhetoric.	  	   What	  the	  rhetorical	  evidence	  seems	  to	  suggest	  is	  that	  Hitler’s	  topoi	  were	  not	  directly	  persuasive	  new	  ideas	  that	  were	  promoted	  and	  spread	  through	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  itself.	  Rather,	  when	  we	  test	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  O’Shaughnessy’s	  and	  Kershaw’s	  five	  topoi	  common	  to	  Hitler	  in	  these	  two	  sets	  of	  transcripts,	  we	  see	  	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  a	  strong	  correlation	  between	  some	  of	  these	  topoi	  and	  the	  generals’	  deliberations	  and	  for	  others	  it	  is	  harder	  to	  tell.	  We	  see	  the	  most	  strong	  correlation	  in	  the	  topoi	  that	  already	  had	  a	  cultural	  basis	  in	  the	  society	  which	  allowed	  Hitler	  to	  more	  easily	  weaponize	  and	  use	  them	  to	  his	  advantage.	  It	  is	  difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible	  to	  say	  whether	  Hitler	  changed	  the	  minds	  of	  those	  who	  were	  persuaded	  by	  his	  rhetoric,	  but	  it	  is	  far	  more	  possible	  to	  make	  the	  claim	  that	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  
   
10 
correlation	  between	  these	  hypothesized	  topoi	  common	  to	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  and	  that	  of	  the	  end-­‐of-­‐war/post-­‐war	  rhetoric	  of	  Eichmann	  and	  the	  generals	  captured	  at	  Trent	  Park.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   First,	  we	  must	  define	  Hitler’s	  rhetorical	  topoi	  so	  we	  know	  what	  we	  are	  looking	  for	  as	  evidence	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  his	  rhetoric.	  Many	  texts	  are	  capable	  of	  make	  such	  claims,	  but	  for	  this	  text	  we	  will	  focus	  on	  Nicholas	  O'Shaughnessy’s	  book,	  
Selling	  Hitler:	  Propaganda	  and	  the	  Nazi	  Brand	  and	  Ian	  Kershaw’s	  The	  “Hitler	  Myth”:	  
Image	  and	  Reality	  in	  the	  Third	  Reich,	  	  while	  looking	  to	  Kenneth	  Burke’s	  essay,	  “The	  Rhetoric	  of	  Hitler’s	  ‘Battle’”	  and	  Neil	  Gregor’s	  book,	  How	  to	  Read	  Hitler	  as	  support	  for	  these	  rhetorical	  topoi.	  These	  four	  texts	  will	  provide	  us	  with	  a	  codex	  of	  topoi	  that	  we	  will	  then	  be	  able	  to	  search	  for	  in	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  those	  who	  are	  often	  claimed	  as	  being	  persuaded	  by	  Hitler’s	  words:	  his	  own	  generals.	  	   As	  was	  previously	  established,	  many	  people	  believe	  that	  Hitler	  was	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  persuaders	  who	  ever	  lived,	  but	  why	  was	  his	  propaganda,	  in	  general,	  so	  successful?	  According	  to	  Nicholas	  O’Shaughnessy,	  there	  are	  four	  main	  factors	  that	  aided	  the	  spread	  of	  such	  propaganda	  and	  its	  related	  ideas	  and	  Kershaw	  will	  provide	  us	  with	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  fifth.	  	   As	  human	  beings,	  we	  instinctually	  compartmentalize	  our	  lives.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  when	  we	  talk	  about	  compartmentalization,	  in	  this	  case,	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  the	  capacity	  of	  people	  “to	  inhabit	  one	  cultural	  world	  and	  yet	  to	  work	  and	  act	  in	  another”	  not	  the	  ability	  of	  people	  to	  not	  think	  about	  what	  was	  happening	  (O’Shaughnessy	  5).	  Compartmentalization,	  in	  this	  case,	  is	  the	  ability	  of	  people	  to	  create	  worlds	  with	  different	  rules	  and	  different	  moral	  codes	  that	  allow	  them	  to	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contextualize	  their	  actions	  as	  moral	  in	  situations	  that	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  immoral	  in	  their	  other	  spheres.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  time	  compartmentalization	  is	  benign	  and	  harmless.	  It	  helps	  us	  to	  multi-­‐task,	  to	  be	  both	  parent	  and	  boss,	  to	  help	  soldiers	  come	  back	  from	  war	  and	  adjust	  to	  life	  back	  home.	  However,	  compartmentalization	  can	  also	  be	  dangerous.	  In	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Nazis,	  it	  was	  just	  that.	  O’Shaughnessy	  argues	  that	  the	  Nazis	  exploited	  this	  tendency	  of	  our	  minds	  to	  fit	  their	  own	  needs	  and	  further	  Nazi	  propaganda.	  The	  way	  this	  tactic	  was	  exploited	  in	  German	  Generals	  was	  to	  support	  the	  compartmentalization	  of	  what	  they	  did	  from	  the	  morality	  of	  their	  actions,	  to	  separate	  duty	  from	  the	  soul,	  and	  to	  simply	  separate	  work	  life	  from	  home	  life.	  This	  mental	  separation	  is	  what	  allowed	  citizens	  and	  generals	  alike	  to	  rationalize	  the	  paradoxes	  of	  the	  regime	  and	  to	  see	  certain	  things	  as	  moral	  in	  one	  context	  but	  immoral	  in	  another	  (O’Shaughnessy	  5).	  	   O’Shaughnessy’s	  second	  characteristic	  of	  Nazi	  propaganda	  is	  one	  that	  many	  scholars	  note:	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  enemy	  that	  presented	  wat	  O’Shaughnessy	  calls	  an	  existential	  threat	  (5).	  Part	  of	  the	  reason	  the	  propaganda	  utilized	  by	  the	  Nazis	  worked	  was	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  war	  was	  purported	  to	  be	  “a	  final	  global	  reckoning”	  between	  the	  German	  people,	  who	  were	  supposedly	  genetically	  superior	  to	  other	  races,	  and	  everyone	  else,	  but	  specifically	  the	  Jewish	  people	  (O’Shaughnessy	  5).	  This	  placed	  Jews	  in	  the	  position	  of	  playing	  the	  role	  of	  ultimate	  enemy	  by	  constituting	  a	  danger	  to	  the	  German	  people	  and	  their	  way	  of	  life.	  Friedländer	  himself	  notes	  the	  beliefs	  of	  Germans	  at	  the	  time:	  “The	  Jew	  was	  a	  lethal	  and	  active	  threat	  to	  all	  nations,	  to	  the	  Aryan	  race	  and	  to	  the	  German	  Volk”	  (xix).	  Creating	  this	  common	  enemy	  allowed	  Nazi	  propaganda	  to	  have	  a	  clear	  and	  focused	  message	  and	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increase	  its	  persuasive	  power.	  The	  idea	  that	  Jews	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  Germans	  is	  one	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  eventually	  allowed	  for	  the	  imprisoning	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  commonly	  held	  German	  belief	  at	  the	  time	  that	  "most	  prisoners	  in	  concentration	  camps	  were	  not	  at	  all	  like	  'good	  citizens'"	  (Gellately	  21).	  But	  this	  imprisonment	  and	  vilification	  went	  beyond	  the	  Jewish	  population	  in	  Germany.	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  Jewish	  threat	  was	  used	  to	  subjugate	  other	  groups	  as	  well.	  All	  other	  subjugated	  groups,	  Roma	  and	  Sinti,	  lgbtqia+,	  people	  of	  color,	  etc.	  were	  somehow	  associated	  with	  Jewish	  people	  and	  because	  of	  this	  association	  had	  to	  be	  captured,	  punished,	  and	  protected	  against	  as	  well	  (Friedländer	  xviii-­‐xix,	  xiv-­‐xv).	  O’Shaughnessy	  describes	  this	  phenomenon	  as	  well.	  He	  describes	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  “imagined	  Jew…the	  enemy	  behind	  all	  other	  enemies”	  (O’Shaughnessy	  5).	  Burke	  quotes	  Hitler	  himself	  discussing	  the	  importance	  of	  creating	  a	  common	  enemy	  and	  notes	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  such	  a	  strategy	  (193).	  According	  to	  Burke,	  “Men	  who	  can	  unite	  on	  nothing	  else	  can	  unite	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  foe	  shared	  by	  all”	  (193).	  This	  strategy	  allowed	  the	  Nazis	  to	  exploit	  a	  previously	  existing	  and	  commonly	  held	  prejudice	  against	  the	  Jewish	  people	  in	  order	  to	  advance	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  singular	  enemy	  of	  the	  people	  of	  Germany	  which	  could	  be	  expanded	  to	  allow	  the	  subjugation	  of	  more	  than	  one	  group	  of	  people.	  	  The	  existence	  and	  importance	  of	  this	  topos	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  perceived	  existential	  threat	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  works	  of	  Kenneth	  Burke	  and	  Neil	  Gregor.	  According	  to	  Burke,	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  contains	  many	  repetitive	  ideas	  or	  topoi,	  one	  of	  which	  is	  his	  reliance	  on	  the	  creation	  of	  what	  Burke	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  “devil”	  (192,	  193).	  Burke	  noted	  that	  Hitler	  spent	  a	  lot	  of	  time	  in	  his	  rhetoric	  attempting	  to	  build	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up	  a	  common	  enemy	  for	  people	  to	  rally	  around.	  This	  “devil,”	  according	  to	  Burke,	  acts	  as	  a	  way	  to	  unify.	  Burke	  quotes	  Hitler	  who	  once	  stated,	  “It	  is	  part	  of	  the	  genius	  of	  a	  great	  leader	  to	  make	  adversaries	  of	  different	  fields	  appear	  as	  always	  belonging	  to	  one	  category	  only”	  (Burke	  193).	  For	  Hitler,	  this	  single	  enemy	  was	  a	  way	  to	  dispel	  doubt.	  By	  labeling	  the	  Jewish	  people	  as	  the	  “devil,”	  Hitler	  is	  able	  to	  not	  only	  make	  it	  easier	  to	  identify	  the	  “enemy”	  but	  also	  to	  dehumanize	  them.	  If	  this	  rhetoric	  is	  successful,	  it	  makes	  sure	  that	  a	  Jewish	  citizen	  is	  not	  seen	  as	  someone’s	  neighbor	  or	  friend	  but	  rather	  a	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  dangerous	  group	  that	  poses	  a	  threat	  to	  Germany’s	  well-­‐being.	  Burke	  also	  delves	  into	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  “projection	  device”	  that	  allowed	  people	  to	  put	  all	  their	  problems	  onto	  an	  external	  scapegoat	  (Burke	  202).	  This	  again	  is	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	  topos	  of	  perceived	  existential	  threat.	  After	  World	  War	  I,	  Germany	  was	  filled	  with	  many	  problems	  and	  this	  scapegoat	  provided	  Aryan	  Germans	  with	  the	  prospect	  of	  life	  going	  “back	  to	  normal”	  once	  the	  created	  “enemy”	  was	  eliminated.	  “Symbolic	  rebirth”	  was	  another	  element	  that	  Burke	  discussed	  and	  that	  stemmed	  from	  this	  idea	  of	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  German	  people	  and	  that	  worked	  to	  unify	  “germans”	  against	  the	  “other”	  (Burke	  203).	  If	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  German	  superiority	  and	  the	  scapegoat	  were	  successful,	  then	  the	  almost	  religious	  image	  of	  German	  rebirth	  was	  a	  potential	  possibility	  that	  would	  exist	  once	  the	  “enemy”	  was	  eliminated.	  This	  non-­‐economic	  explanation	  for	  economic,	  political,	  and	  cultural	  problems	  created	  a	  beneficial	  conflict	  for	  Hitler’s	  message.	  Burke	  writes,	  “the	  ‘Aryan’	  to	  continue	  his	  construction,	  must	  destroy	  the	  Jewish	  destruction.	  The	  Aryan,	  as	  the	  vessel	  of	  love,	  must	  hate	  the	  Jewish	  hate”	  (Burke	  204).	  If	  every	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problem	  is	  attributed	  to	  the	  Jewish	  people,	  then	  no	  problem	  or	  blame	  can	  be	  placed	  on	  himself	  or	  those	  who	  subscribe	  to	  his	  rhetoric.	  Neil	  Gregor	  dealt	  with	  aspects	  of	  this	  topos	  as	  well.	  Gregor	  noted	  Hitler’s	  dichotomous	  description	  of	  Germans	  and	  Jews.	  He	  explains	  that	  Hitler	  often	  repeated	  that	  all	  enemies	  are	  Jews,	  and	  argues	  that	  Hitler	  worked	  to	  associate	  Jews	  with	  a	  number	  of	  evil	  and	  immoral	  qualities	  such	  as	  “corruption,	  materialism,	  selfishness,	  mendaciousness,	  [and]	  cowardice”	  (Gregor	  8-­‐9).	  This	  description	  is	  put	  in	  contrast	  with	  the	  description	  of	  the	  idealized	  German	  citizen.	  Hitler	  utilized	  rhetoric	  to	  associate	  the	  German	  people	  with	  qualities	  of	  virtue	  and	  strength	  such	  as	  “honesty,	  idealism,	  selflessness,	  and	  bravery”	  (Gregor	  9).	  Hitler	  believed	  and	  often	  stated	  that	  the	  German	  people	  were	  superior	  to	  other	  “races”	  (Gregor	  9).	  This	  creation	  of	  a	  drastic	  good	  vs.	  evil	  contrast	  of	  the	  German	  people	  and	  the	  Jewish	  people	  that	  Hitler	  believed	  to	  be	  biologically	  determined	  was	  picked	  up	  on	  by	  Gregor	  in	  Hitler’s	  writings	  and	  speeches.	  This	  emphasis	  on	  a	  biological	  determinism	  brings	  us	  to	  another	  piece	  of	  support	  for	  the	  prevalence	  of	  the	  topos	  of	  perceived	  existential	  threat.	  The	  biological	  and	  medical	  metaphors	  employed	  by	  Hitler	  to	  solidify	  the	  differences	  between	  Germans	  and	  Jews	  are	  this	  evidence.	  According	  to	  Gregor,	  Hitler	  gives	  a	  biological	  explanation	  for	  the	  racial	  distinction	  between	  Germans	  and	  Jews.	  Where	  previous	  anti-­‐Semitism	  saw	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  “Jewish	  problem”	  in	  conversion	  to	  Christianity,	  Hitler’s	  brand	  of	  anti-­‐Semitism	  didn’t	  see	  this	  as	  a	  possibility	  (Gregor	  62).	  Race,	  in	  Hitler’s	  view,	  was	  something	  that	  is	  embedded	  in	  DNA;	  it	  is	  not	  something	  that	  can	  be	  changed.	  This	  inherently	  biological	  difference	  that	  Hitler	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imagined	  meant	  that	  assimilation,	  in	  his	  mind,	  was	  the	  very	  opposite	  of	  a	  solution	  and	  instead	  increased	  “contamination”	  (Gregor	  63).	  This	  contamination	  is	  where	  we	  again	  see	  this	  connection	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  perceived	  existential	  threat.	  Because	  Hitler	  defined	  these	  differences	  is	  such	  a	  fixed	  way,	  he	  could	  not	  employ	  what	  had	  previously	  been	  seen	  as	  a	  “solution”	  and,	  instead,	  had	  to	  find	  a	  different	  “solution.”	  	  In	  retrospect,	  we	  can	  see	  this	  as	  a	  precursor	  to	  the	  genocide	  that	  was	  to	  come.	  This	  topos	  of	  a	  biological,	  “unfixable”	  quality	  of	  racial	  difference	  could	  very	  possibly	  have	  been	  used	  to	  justify	  future	  actions;	  therefore,	  it	  will	  be	  useful	  to	  see	  if	  this	  topos	  appears	  in	  the	  justifications	  and	  explanations	  of	  Hitler’s	  generals.	  This	  biological	  metaphor	  was	  extended	  to	  also	  encompass	  comparisons	  between	  Jews	  and	  disease,	  something	  that	  you	  eradicate	  or	  cleanse	  yourself	  of	  and	  again	  a	  recognizable	  threat	  (Gregor	  65).	  Hitler’s	  biological	  metaphor,	  once	  again,	  places	  genocide	  as	  the	  outcome	  of	  such	  beliefs,	  and	  further	  prompts	  us	  to	  look	  out	  for	  this	  topos.	  Gregor	  also	  saw	  this	  related	  element	  of	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  “threat”	  the	  Jewish	  people	  posed	  in	  Hitler’s	  Mein	  Kampf	  	  through	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  Darwinian	  struggle	  for	  survival	  (Gregor	  41).	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  emphasize	  that	  race	  was	  central	  to	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  and	  ideology.	  Hitler	  described	  each	  county’s	  people	  as	  a	  single	  race,	  and	  these	  races	  as	  competing	  against	  one	  another	  for	  resources	  such	  as	  land	  and	  food	  and	  power.	  He	  did	  not	  believe	  in	  the	  artificial	  borders	  that	  were	  drawn	  by	  governments	  and	  instead	  seemed	  to	  hold	  the	  belief	  that	  you	  took	  the	  land	  you	  needed	  for	  your	  people.	  Gregor	  explains	  Hitler’s	  thinking,	  “As	  a	  people	  grew	  in	  strength,	  so	  its	  needs	  grew,	  which	  would	  inevitably	  lead	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  its	  borders”	  (Gregor	  41).	  Hitler	  held	  the	  belief	  “that	  success	  or	  failure	  in	  the	  eternal	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struggle	  for	  space	  depended	  not	  on	  superficial	  issues	  such	  as	  military	  strategy	  or	  the	  relative	  size	  of	  armies	  and	  navies	  but	  rested	  instead	  on	  the	  underlying	  health	  of	  the	  races	  involved	  in	  the	  struggle”	  (Gregor	  44).	  Here	  we	  see	  Hitler	  trying	  to	  further	  create	  the	  topos	  of	  fear	  of	  the	  existential	  threat	  through	  the	  presentation	  of	  a	  geographical/	  political	  threat.	  On	  top	  of	  this,	  Gregor	  notes	  that	  Hitler,	  in	  Mein	  Kampf,	  claims	  that	  “Germany	  had	  gone	  to	  war	  weakened	  by	  internal	  problems	  and	  divisions	  that	  had	  fatally	  undermined	  her	  capacity	  to	  resist	  and	  had	  thus	  made	  defeat	  inevitable”	  claiming	  that	  these	  internal	  divisions	  resulted	  in	  Germany’s	  “unpreparedness	  to	  fight”	  (Gregor	  49).	  These	  internal	  divisions	  included	  problems	  such	  as	  the	  weakening	  of	  the	  peasant	  class,	  the	  press	  undermining	  Germany’s	  unity,	  and	  Marxism.	  But	  Hitler	  didn’t	  stop	  by	  identifying	  these	  potential	  problems	  within	  Germany	  that	  led	  to	  its	  downfall.	  He	  already	  established	  that	  the	  German	  people	  were	  supposedly	  superior	  and	  practically	  infallible,	  so	  blame	  could	  not	  be	  their	  own.	  According	  to	  Hitler,	  this	  was	  all	  the	  result	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people.	  It	  was	  the	  Jewish	  people	  who	  benefited	  most	  from	  the	  stock	  exchange,	  who	  ran	  the	  press,	  who	  supported	  Marxism	  and	  whom	  Marxism	  benefitted	  (Gregor	  49-­‐50).	  	  Here,	  again,	  we	  see	  an	  instance	  of	  Hitler	  using	  Jews	  as	  a	  scapegoat	  to	  further	  solidify	  his	  creation	  of	  a	  single	  enemy	  force	  (Gregor	  49).	  By	  blaming	  the	  Jews	  for	  economic	  and	  political	  problems,	  Hitler	  harnessed	  all	  the	  contempt	  and	  anger	  the	  German	  people	  had	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  issues	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  people	  and	  placed	  it	  on	  to	  a	  single,	  identifiable	  enemy.	  	  According	  to	  Gregor,	  Hitler	  also	  made	  claims	  throughout	  Mein	  Kampf	  of	  a	  Jewish	  plot	  to	  profit	  systematically	  from	  World	  War	  I	  and	  also	  claimed	  that	  the	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Jewish	  people	  did	  not	  do	  their	  part	  in	  the	  war	  effort	  (Gregor	  58).	  Both	  of	  these	  claims	  are	  blatantly	  and	  statistically	  proven	  to	  be	  untrue;	  however,	  the	  claims	  aided	  Hitler’s	  effort	  to	  further	  demonize	  the	  Jewish	  people.	  According	  to	  Gregor	  Hitler	  “conjured	  up	  the	  crude	  vision	  of	  a	  Germany	  slowly,	  inexorably	  being	  taken	  over	  by	  the	  Jewish	  world	  conspiracy”	  (Gregor	  60).	  Hitler	  created	  this	  topos	  of	  a	  perceived	  existential	  threat	  thoroughly	  and	  he	  reinforced	  it	  as	  often	  as	  he	  could.	  This	  is	  a	  topos	  that	  would	  have	  had	  an	  extreme	  effect	  on	  the	  war	  if	  it	  is	  shown	  to	  be	  persuasive.	  It	  will	  be	  interesting	  to	  see	  if	  there	  is	  rhetorical	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  Hitler’s	  generals	  were	  convicted	  of	  this	  topos.	  	   A	  third	  factor	  results	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Nazis,	  the	  men	  pushing	  these	  ideas	  were,	  at	  their	  roots,	  opportunists.	  These	  Nazis	  had	  elections	  they	  had	  to	  win	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  power.	  For	  this	  reason,	  O’Shaughnessy	  notes,	  the	  Nazis	  acted	  as	  “traditional	  operators,	  opportunists,	  political	  in	  the	  gut	  sense”	  (O’Shaughnessy	  5).	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Nazis,	  according	  to	  O’Shaughnessy,	  employed	  a	  strategy	  of	  being	  “all	  things	  to	  all	  men”	  (5).	  	  There	  was	  an	  effort	  to	  always	  have	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  say	  to	  fit	  the	  person	  or	  group	  of	  people	  of	  concern.	  They	  “possessed	  of	  a	  chameleon	  like	  capacity	  to	  address	  the	  different	  needs	  of	  different	  and	  antithetical	  groups	  in	  the	  language	  those	  groups	  recognized”	  (O’Shaughnessy	  5).	  The	  Nazis	  were	  capable	  of	  molding	  themselves	  into	  the	  shape	  of	  whatever	  it	  is	  others	  wanted	  to	  see.	  They	  did	  so	  out	  of	  a	  hope	  for	  political	  survival.	  This	  tendency	  to	  evolve	  into	  the	  person	  that	  best	  fits	  the	  situation	  is	  an	  extremely	  important	  rhetorical	  technique.	  If	  it	  is	  unclear	  that	  this	  person	  is	  constantly	  changing	  their	  behaviors	  and	  convictions,	  the	  belief	  that	  a	  person	  holds	  your	  same	  values,	  uses	  your	  language,	  and	  wants	  to	  address	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your	  concerns	  increases	  ethos,	  logos,	  and	  pathos	  claims	  and	  increases	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  propaganda	  coming	  from	  the	  person	  will	  be	  more	  convincing.	  	  Burke	  also	  mentions	  this	  political	  opportunism	  when	  he	  discusses	  the	  importance	  of	  Hitler’s	  “attack	  upon	  the	  parliamentary”	  (Burke	  199).	  Parliament	  was	  extremely	  chaotic	  and	  Hitler	  used	  this	  chaos	  to	  create	  a	  dichotomy	  between	  the	  instability	  that	  existed	  and	  his	  plan	  for	  implementing	  a	  system	  with	  stability;	  this	  chaos	  was	  the	  kind	  of	  thing	  that	  he	  claimed	  he	  would	  fix	  (Burke	  200).	  This	  is	  an	  excellent	  example	  of	  Hitler	  using	  this	  strategy	  of	  political	  opportunism.	  Though	  these	  goals	  were	  ones	  he	  actually	  believed	  to	  be	  necessary	  to	  the	  success	  of	  Germany,	  the	  way	  they	  paved	  the	  way	  to	  more	  extreme	  policies	  is	  an	  excellent	  example	  of	  this	  topoi	  of	  opportunism.	  He	  noticed	  a	  problem	  that	  others	  were	  complaining	  about,	  often	  one	  he	  too	  wished	  to	  fix,	  and	  he	  claimed	  to	  have	  an	  answer	  and	  be	  the	  solution.	  	  In	  Mein	  Kampf,	  Hitler	  spends	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  time	  talking	  about	  the	  problems	  within	  the	  current	  and	  past	  government.	  Gregor	  states	  “Hitler	  spent	  as	  much	  time	  describing	  what	  was	  wrong	  with	  past	  policy	  decisions	  as	  he	  did	  outlining	  his	  own	  prescriptions”	  (Gregor	  14).	  He	  uses	  his	  discussion	  of	  Germany’s	  history	  to	  make	  comparisons	  between	  Germany’s	  former	  glory	  and	  potential	  and	  the	  Weimar	  Republic’s	  current	  decline	  (Gregor	  15).	  This	  is	  a	  topos	  we	  also	  found	  within	  the	  Burke	  piece	  which	  describes	  Hitler’s	  utilization	  of	  this	  history	  and	  current	  decline	  to	  promote	  his	  own	  plan	  for	  greatness.	  Here	  we	  see	  him	  beginning	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Gregor	  states,	  “He	  looked	  back	  to	  an	  ill-­‐defined	  mythical	  golden	  past	  as	  a	  source	  of	  inspiration”	  (Gregor	  17).	  As	  Gregor	  explains,	  Hitler	  was	  not	  utilizing	  Germany’s	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former	  glory	  as	  a	  blueprint	  for	  how	  he	  would	  run	  Germany,	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  vague	  encouraging	  force	  to	  remind	  Germany	  of	  its	  potential.	  This	  was	  politically	  opportunistic	  as	  it	  leads	  in	  to	  Hitler’s	  goal	  of	  national	  rebirth	  and	  renewal	  (Gregor	  54).	  Hitler	  wanted	  to	  create	  an	  idealistic,	  egalitarian,	  unified	  Germany	  (Gregor	  55).	  He	  claimed	  he	  would	  raise	  the	  status	  of	  the	  working	  class	  and	  reunite	  a	  broken	  people.	  Hitler’s	  preoccupation	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  single,	  unified	  voice	  of	  the	  German	  people	  was	  also	  politically	  opportunistic	  (Burke	  207).	  Coming	  out	  of	  WWI	  and	  existing	  in	  a	  world	  defined	  by	  the	  ensuing	  chaos	  that	  comes	  from	  losing	  a	  war,	  the	  idea	  of	  unity	  and	  peace	  would	  be	  one	  that	  appealed	  to	  many	  people.	  Hitler	  was	  disappointed	  by	  the	  parliament	  of	  the	  Weimar	  Republic,	  but	  also	  had	  a	  more	  specific	  concern.	  Gregor	  states,	  “He	  saw	  in	  the	  more	  recent	  German	  past	  a	  process	  of	  decline	  set	  in	  train	  by	  the	  advent	  of	  industrial	  modernity	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  commerce-­‐driven	  world”	  (Gregor	  17)	  Hitler	  viewed	  “politics	  and	  the	  daily	  life	  of	  individuals	  as	  being	  excessively	  driven	  by	  commercial	  or	  materialistic	  prerogatives”	  and	  in	  the	  vein	  of	  creating	  a	  single	  enemy	  and	  scapegoat,	  again	  blamed	  Jews	  for	  this	  decline	  (Gregor	  17).	  Hitler	  utilized	  the	  weakened	  government	  to	  push	  his	  own	  agenda,	  and	  this	  is	  a	  clear	  use	  of	  political	  opportunism.	  Hitler’s	  staunch	  belief	  that	  it	  was	  Germany’s	  right	  to	  expand	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  its	  needs	  was	  key	  to	  his	  foreign	  policy	  goals	  (Gregor	  91).	  This	  idea	  of	  “living-­‐space”	  would	  determine	  a	  lot.	  	  In	  order	  to	  expand,	  Hitler	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  take	  land	  from	  other	  people,	  but	  due	  to	  his	  notion	  of	  racial	  identity,	  these	  non-­‐ethnically	  German	  people,	  for	  example	  the	  Poles,	  would	  not	  just	  become	  German	  once	  under	  German	  rule;	  therefore,	  according	  to	  Hitler,	  they	  would	  need	  to	  be	  expelled	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  the	  country	  “pure”	  (Gregor	  98).	  This	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expansion	  was	  also	  targeted	  toward	  the	  East	  due	  to	  Hitler’s	  obsession	  with	  the	  downfall	  of	  Marxism	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (Gregor	  96).	  Again	  here,	  we	  see	  the	  utilization	  of	  the	  topos	  of	  political	  opportunism	  and	  the	  grand	  effects	  it	  was	  eventually	  able	  to	  have.	  Another	  important	  aspect	  of	  the	  topoi	  of	  political	  opportunism	  is	  the	  idea	  of	  German	  superiority.	  	  It	  is	  a	  wonderful	  example	  of	  the	  chameleon-­‐like,	  always-­‐have-­‐the-­‐answer	  opportunism	  that	  the	  Nazis	  took	  advantage	  of.	  According	  to	  Burke,	  Hitler	  often	  made	  claims	  of	  the	  inborn	  dignity/superiority	  of	  the	  German	  people.	  Much	  of	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  involves	  discussion	  regarding	  the	  superiority	  and	  merits	  of	  the	  German	  people	  not	  just	  over	  those	  peoples	  who	  were	  to	  be	  persecuted	  but	  to	  all	  of	  the	  world.	  The	  dichotomy	  Hitler	  created	  when	  discussing	  “Aryan	  ‘heroism’	  and	  ‘sacrifice’	  vs.	  Jewish	  ‘cunning’	  and	  ‘arrogance’”	  is	  one	  example	  of	  him	  telling	  people	  what	  they	  wanted	  to	  hear,	  in	  this	  case	  while	  also	  strongly	  believing	  it	  himself	  (208).	  Focusing	  on	  the	  Aryan	  sacrifice	  is	  extremely	  important	  to	  his	  message.	  This	  employment	  of	  pathos	  would	  be	  potentially	  extremely	  effective	  with	  the	  citizens	  of	  Germany	  who	  have	  experienced	  personal	  loss.	  By	  invoking	  this	  emotion	  in	  the	  person	  experiencing	  the	  rhetoric	  while	  also	  presenting	  them	  with	  someone	  to	  blame	  for	  your	  hurt	  could	  be	  very	  successful	  in	  further	  demonizing	  Jews.	  	   Another	  factor	  noted	  by	  O’Shaughnessy	  is	  that	  of	  Hitler’s	  charismatic	  aura.	  He	  makes	  the	  almost	  mystical-­‐seeming	  claim	  that	  “Hitler	  projected	  a	  charisma	  which	  impressed,	  or	  even	  mesmerized,	  a	  substantial	  number	  of	  German	  voters”	  and	  he	  notes	  the	  extraordinary	  power	  of	  such	  ability	  (O’Shaughnessy	  4).	  	  O’Shaughnessy	  describes	  the	  extent	  of	  this	  aspect	  of	  Hitler’s	  rhetorical	  capability	  through	  a	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comparison	  of	  this	  persuasion	  to	  religiosity.	  He	  claims	  that	  being	  persuaded	  by	  Hitler	  left	  people	  with	  “not	  only	  the	  experience	  of	  conviction	  but	  of	  religious	  conversion”	  (O’Shaughnessy	  4).	  One	  who	  was	  persuaded	  by	  Hitler	  was	  left	  with	  a	  certitude	  and	  assurance	  that	  rivaled	  that	  of	  being	  persuaded	  by	  an	  ancient	  institution	  that	  claims	  to	  know	  the	  intangible	  and	  unknowable	  and	  that	  claims	  to	  have	  an	  understanding	  of	  this	  greater	  truth.	  This	  is	  what	  Hitler	  and	  his	  government	  were	  able	  to	  achieve	  in	  just	  a	  few	  years.	  Hitler’s	  charisma,	  O’Shaughnessy	  claims,	  was	  able	  to	  create	  a	  uniquely	  powerful	  level	  of	  conviction	  and	  with	  it	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  devotion	  in	  those	  who	  encountered	  it.	  O’Shaughnessy	  describes	  Hitler	  as	  “both	  the	  monarch	  and	  the	  high	  priest	  of	  a	  faith	  in	  which	  the	  nation	  was	  the	  core	  article	  of	  belief”	  and	  also	  as	  “a	  dramaturgy	  of	  performance,	  a	  physical	  act”	  (O’Shaughnessy	  4	  and	  5).	  This	  vision	  of	  Hitler	  as	  a	  god-­‐like	  figure	  who	  was	  the	  sole	  knower	  of	  a	  greater	  truth	  automatically	  elevates	  the	  man	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  those	  persuaded.	  He	  presented	  himself	  as	  more	  than	  just	  a	  man,	  and	  instead,	  presented	  himself	  as	  a	  figure	  deserving	  of	  reverence.	  This	  is	  dangerous	  because	  it	  makes	  the	  words	  of	  the	  man	  gospel,	  it	  turns	  his	  beliefs	  into	  law,	  and	  it	  puts	  this	  single	  person	  in	  the	  position	  of	  an	  entire	  country’s	  moral	  compass.	  	   The	  topos	  of	  propaganda	  of	  the	  deed	  was	  also	  very	  prevalent	  in	  Hitler’s	  and	  the	  Reich’s	  rhetoric.	  After	  World	  War	  I,	  Germany	  existed	  in	  a	  state	  of	  upheaval	  and	  its	  citizens	  had	  felt	  the	  effects	  of	  this.	  Hitler	  was	  a	  promise	  of	  a	  new	  Germany,	  a	  united	  Germany	  that	  would	  not	  only	  be	  restored	  but	  renewed.	  In	  the	  beginning,	  this	  seemed	  to	  hold	  true.	  There	  was	  a	  constructed	  view	  that	  Hitler	  was	  single	  handedly	  responsible	  for	  fixing	  all	  of	  the	  countries	  problems	  (Kershaw	  66).	  In	  the	  short	  time	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after	  Hitler	  took	  office,	  the	  government	  was	  seemingly	  up	  and	  running	  efficiently	  once	  again	  with	  a	  drive	  to	  be	  better	  (Kershaw	  46).	  The	  people	  of	  Germany	  were	  seeing	  a	  government	  that	  was	  “energetically	  combating	  the	  great	  problems	  of	  unemployment,	  rural	  indebtedness,	  and	  poverty”	  and	  doing	  so	  fairly	  successfully	  (Kershaw	  61).	  	  Whether	  these	  improvements	  could	  actually	  be	  attributed	  entirely	  to	  Hitler	  himself	  is	  doubtful,	  but	  he	  was	  a	  man	  who	  had	  been	  underestimated,	  so	  his	  quick	  mastery	  of	  the	  political	  situation	  was	  surprising	  (Kershaw	  46).	  This	  perception	  of	  adeptness	  helped	  create	  this	  mythological	  view	  of	  Hitler’s	  achievements	  in	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  Reich.	  Any	  improvements	  were	  systematically	  attributed	  to	  Hitler	  through	  small	  local	  newspapers	  that	  Nazi	  editors	  used	  to	  spread	  such	  propaganda	  (Kershaw	  61).	  This	  belief	  in	  all	  the	  good	  Hitler	  supposedly	  did	  for	  Germany	  in	  these	  early	  days	  created	  a	  larger	  platform	  that	  was	  made	  available	  for	  the	  propagation	  of	  future	  and	  more	  radical	  policies	  (Kershaw	  61).	  This	  platform	  was	  widened	  and	  became	  even	  less	  regulated	  by	  the	  creation	  in	  Germany	  of	  a	  sense	  that,	  even	  if	  there	  were	  “temporary	  hardships	  and	  cares,	  the	  Führer	  was	  in	  control	  and	  knew	  the	  way	  forward	  to	  better	  times”	  (Kershaw	  65-­‐66).	  	  A	  very	  similar	  concept	  to	  	  propaganda	  of	  the	  deed	  is	  also	  addressed	  by	  Kenneth	  Burke’s	  recognition	  of	  a	  Hitler’s	  creation	  of	  a	  “cult	  of	  war”	  that	  claimed	  to	  be	  based	  on	  reason	  and	  claimed	  to	  be	  created	  out	  of	  a	  want	  of	  peace	  and	  humility	  (Burke	  199).	  This	  positive	  interpretation	  of	  the	  message	  of	  Hitler’s	  Germany	  may	  have	  been	  extremely	  popular	  to	  those	  generals	  and	  citizens	  trying	  to	  explain	  away	  their	  behavior	  after	  the	  war.	  It	  will	  be	  interesting	  to	  note	  who	  utilizes	  this	  topos	  and	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when	  this	  topos	  is	  employed	  in	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  others.	  	  This	  propaganda	  of	  the	  early	  deeds	  of	  the	  Reich	  helped	  to	  establish	  a	  citizenship	  that	  was	  unconcerned	  with	  the	  actual	  facts	  and	  reasons	  why	  and	  how	  these	  early	  improvements	  were	  being	  made.	  According	  to	  Kershaw,	  “The	  most	  important	  thing	  was	  the	  feeling	  that	  things	  were	  improving	  again”	  (62).	  This	  focus	  on	  the	  initial	  good	  that	  occurred	  in	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  Reich	  is	  not	  only	  an	  aspect	  of	  Hitler’s	  and	  the	  Reich’s	  rhetorical	  practices,	  but	  also	  an	  aspect	  of	  that	  rhetoric	  that	  we	  may	  see	  replicated	  and	  repeated	  in	  deliberations	  and	  rationalizations	  of	  German	  generals	  both	  publicly	  and	  privately.	  	  As	  we	  can	  see	  from	  these	  four	  authorities	  on	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Reich,	  there	  is	  a	  solid	  compilation	  of	  features	  of	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  that	  he	  both	  implemented	  and	  encouraged.	  O’Shaunessy	  and	  Kershaw,	  with	  support	  from	  Burke	  and	  Gregor,	  	  provide	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  a	  codex	  of	  these	  five	  repetitive	  and	  replicable	  features	  of	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  that	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  see	  evidence	  of	  in	  the	  rationalizations	  of	  Hitler’s	  generals.	  These	  five	  potentially	  replicable	  topoi	  are	  exploitation	  of	  capacity	  to	  compartmentalize,	  perceived	  existential	  threat,	  opportunism,	  charisma,	  and	  propaganda	  of	  the	  deed.	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INVESTIGATION	  OF	  TRANSCRIPTS	  
	  
Exploitation	  Of	  The	  Capacity	  To	  Compartmentalize	  
	  
Private	  	   The	  first	  major	  topoi	  that	  we	  will	  discuss	  is	  that	  of	  the	  exploitation	  of	  the	  capacity	  to	  compartmentalize	  that	  often	  manifests	  in	  other’s	  deliberations	  as	  an	  argument	  about	  ‘just	  following	  orders.’	  Again,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  compartmentalization	  O’Shaunessy	  is	  talking	  about	  here	  is	  not	  one’s	  ability	  to	  ignore	  the	  unpleasant	  but	  rather	  the	  ability	  of	  people	  to	  create	  separate	  worlds	  with	  separate	  moral	  codes	  that	  inevitably	  justify	  behavior	  in	  those	  worlds.	  In	  both	  public	  and	  private	  discussions,	  German	  generals	  of	  various	  ranks	  cite	  this	  as	  one	  of	  the	  major	  reasons	  and	  excuses	  for	  some	  of	  the	  major	  atrocities	  of	  the	  war.	  In	  a	  way	  this	  makes	  sense.	  From	  a	  strictly	  rhetorical	  perspective,	  this	  is	  a	  fairly	  effective	  strategy.	  By	  claiming	  that	  they	  were	  just	  following	  orders	  they	  utilize	  pathos	  to	  present	  themselves	  as	  another	  victim	  of	  a	  higher	  power.	  They	  provide	  themselves	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  retrospectively	  and	  selectively	  disavow	  prior	  action	  or	  beliefs	  and	  paint	  them	  in	  their	  own	  light	  entirely.	  They	  also	  bring	  the	  observer	  into	  their	  narrative	  and	  unconsciously	  get	  them	  asking,	  what	  would	  I	  have	  done	  in	  this	  scenario.	  This	  serves	  to	  create	  a	  potentially	  more	  lenient	  audience	  if	  they	  are	  convinced.	  	  	   Many	  of	  the	  generals	  captured	  and	  held	  at	  Trent	  Park	  used	  this	  topos	  in	  discussion	  with	  one	  another	  suggesting	  that	  there	  could	  be	  some	  reality	  to	  the	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claim;	  however,	  many	  others	  outrightly	  protest	  anyone	  using	  this	  excuse.	  There	  does	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  a	  very	  strong	  sense	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  blind	  loyalty	  to	  the	  cause,	  however,	  that	  is	  exemplified	  in	  the	  Hitler	  Oath.	  This	  establishes	  a	  culture	  of	  problematic	  levels	  of	  allegiance	  and	  an	  almost	  religious	  devotion	  to	  country	  and	  to	  Hitler	  himself.	  	  	   In	  regards	  to	  the	  oath	  and	  the	  blind	  loyalty	  required,	  there	  was	  much	  debate.	  The	  recordings	  that	  address	  this	  topos	  occurred	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war	  when	  it	  was	  becoming	  clear	  that	  Germany	  was	  losing.	  This	  prompted	  wide	  disagreement	  between	  those	  captured	  on	  what	  loyalty	  was	  still	  required	  and	  acceptable	  in	  these	  conditions.	  For	  many,	  Hitler’s	  more	  erratic	  conduct	  and	  growing	  incompetence	  meant	  the	  oath	  no	  longer	  held	  power.	  Bruhn1	  in	  April	  of	  1945	  and	  in	  conversation	  with	  Fischer2	  discussed	  their	  outrage	  at	  the	  deception	  of	  the	  German	  government.	  Bruhn	  states,	  "Oh,	  that	  oath	  is	  rubbish.	  Hitler	  has	  released	  us	  from	  our	  oath	  by	  his	  whole	  behavior.	  One	  is	  only	  constantly	  astounded	  that	  we	  all	  ran	  after	  this	  will	  o'	  the	  wisp	  as	  we	  did"	  (Nietzel	  147).	  	  
                                                
1 Generalmajor Johannes Bruhn entered the army during WWI and thus entered 
WWII at the outbreak. He was captured and taken to Trent Park in December of 
1944. According to the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre, or 
CSDIC (UK), who collected these transcripts, while at Trent Park he was 
“considered ‘anti-Nazi’” (Neitzel 284). 
2 Generalmajor Gerhard Fischer entered the Army in WWI and entered WWII in 
August of 1939. He was at Trent Park from April to July of 1945. According to 
CSDIC (UK), while at Trent Park “he [had] a very low opinion of Nazi rule and Is 
thoroughly defeatist” (Neitzel 292-293). 
3 Major Hasso Viebig entered the army in May of 1934, and during the war he 
served in Poland, Russia, and France. He was captured in August of 1944. In an 
assessment from the German army in 1943 he was described as having a “great 2 G neralmajor Gerhard Fischer entered the Army in WWI and entered WWII in 
August of 1939. He was at Trent Park from April to July of 1945. According to 
CSDIC (UK), while at Trent Park “he [had] a very low opinion of Nazi rule and Is 
thoroughly defeatist” (Neitzel 292-293). 
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   This	  dismissal	  of	  any	  remaining	  allegiance	  was	  common	  among	  many,	  but	  	  other	  generals	  were	  unable	  to	  consider	  breaking	  either	  the	  oath	  itself	  or	  purely	  their	  loyalty	  to	  country	  due	  to	  an	  ingrained	  sense	  of	  principle	  and	  honor.	  This	  is	  best	  expressed	  by	  Vieberg3	  who	  states,	  “	  I	  have	  always	  held	  the	  view	  that	  as	  a	  soldier	  one	  is	  bound	  to	  obey	  one’s	  supreme	  commander	  under	  all	  circumstances”	  (Neitzel	  255).	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  specifically	  that,	  "for	  me	  to	  revolt	  against	  my	  supreme	  commander	  would	  be	  something	  that	  I	  could	  not	  reconcile	  with	  my	  honour.	  That	  has	  nothing	  whatever	  to	  do	  with	  my	  political	  views"	  (Neitzel	  256).	  The	  “revolt	  against	  my	  supreme	  commander”	  he	  is	  discussing	  here	  is	  the	  July	  20th	  plot	  to	  assassinate	  Adolf	  Hitler.	  	  	   The	  fact	  that	  he	  sees	  this	  as	  something	  he	  could	  never	  do,	  but	  does	  not	  morally	  or	  politically	  condemn	  is	  huge.	  This	  ability	  to	  compartmentalize	  was	  a	  significant	  tool	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Reich	  used	  to	  propagate	  their	  worldview	  and	  the	  actions	  they	  took	  to	  attain	  it.	  Vieberg’s	  statement	  suggests	  that	  he	  is	  aware	  of	  how	  big	  a	  problem	  Hitler	  is	  to	  the	  state	  of	  Germany,	  not	  morally,	  but	  politically	  and	  economically.	  The	  fact	  that	  he	  still	  feels	  that	  it	  is	  his	  responsibility	  as	  a	  soldier	  to	  rebuke	  the	  assassination	  attempt	  of	  a	  man	  he	  worries	  could	  bring	  down	  the	  country	  and	  lose	  them	  the	  war	  is	  extraordinary.	  To	  Viebig,	  and	  to	  many,	  it	  does	  not	  matter	  what	  they	  believe	  to	  be	  right	  and	  wrong	  politically,	  morally,	  socially,	  etc.,	  what	  matters	  is	  the	  promise	  that	  they	  made.	  Some	  took	  this	  loyalty	  to	  Hitler	  even	  further,	  
                                                
3 Major Hasso Viebig entered the army in May of 1934, and during the war he 
served in Poland, Russia, and France. He was captured in August of 1944. In an 
assessment from the German army in 1943 he was described as having a “great 
awareness of duty” and as a “convinced National Socialist who knows how to 
disseminate his belief” (Neitzel 317). 
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Spang4,	  another	  captured	  general	  at	  one	  point	  states	  "I	  have	  a	  very	  clear	  opinion	  on	  it,	  too,	  but	  the	  Führer	  is	  my	  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief.	  I	  ought	  not	  to	  speak	  about	  it"	  (Neitzel	  252).	  There	  is	  a	  sense	  that	  Hitler	  and	  the	  party	  do	  not	  only	  decide	  and	  have	  control	  over	  the	  actions	  of	  these	  generals,	  but	  also	  their	  opinions.	  Crüwell5	  at	  one	  point	  states	  in	  regards	  to	  Hess	  who	  had	  recently	  been	  deemed	  a	  traitor	  because	  of	  a	  failed	  mission	  to	  arrange	  peace	  with	  the	  British	  behind	  the	  back	  of	  Hitler,	  “No	  one	  but	  his	  superior	  officer,	  the	  Führer,	  can	  decide	  about	  that.	  If	  the	  Führer	  repudiates	  him,	  I	  also	  repudiate	  him"	  (Neitzel	  65).	  This	  is	  an	  extremely	  intense,	  all-­‐encompassing	  kind	  of	  devotion	  to	  a	  leader.	  	   One	  of	  the	  really	  interesting	  divisions	  that	  was	  brought	  up	  by	  a	  number	  of	  generals	  was	  the	  separation	  between	  the	  Party	  and	  the	  Army.	  They	  claimed	  that	  there	  was	  an	  abuse	  of	  blind	  loyalty	  that	  resulted	  in	  bad	  orders	  getting	  passed	  down	  because	  of	  this	  separation.	  Thoma6	  states,	  "I	  mean,	  it's	  a	  psychological	  disease	  which	  has	  spread	  throughout	  the	  Party,	  not	  the	  Army,	  that	  everything	  Jewish	  must	  be	  exterminated	  -­‐-­‐	  they	  have	  orders	  to	  do	  it"	  (Neitzel	  181).	  They	  all	  seem	  to	  agree	  that	  
                                                
4 Generalleutnant Karl Spang entered the army in August of 1905 and served 
throughout WWII. He was at Trent Park from August of 1944 to September of 
1944. In an assessment from April of 1941 he was described as “a difficult man” 
and “very nervous, almost morbidly ambitious,” and the CSDIC (UK) described 
him as “mentally deranged and show[ing] signs of suicidal tendencies” and also 
as “very anti-Nazi” (Neitzel 314-315). 
5 General Der Panzertruppe Ludwig Crüwell entered the army in March of 1911. 
He was held at Trent Park from August of 1942 to June of 1944. According to the 
CSDIC (UK), “he headed the ‘Nazi clique’, and was a follower and admirer of 
Hitler” and was described as “an ignorant, stupid, sentimental, narrow-minded, 
conceited, vain and self-satisfied type of Prussian senior officer” (Neitzel 287). 
6 General Der Panzertruppen Wilhelm Ritter Von Thoma entered the army in 
September of 1912 and was brought to Trent Park in November of 1942. 
According to the CSDIC (UK), he portrayed himself as “violently anti-Nazi” during 
his time at Trent Park (Neitzel 315-316). 
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the	  root	  of	  the	  problem	  comes	  from	  the	  top	  down.	  To	  them,	  the	  army	  is	  just	  following	  the	  bad	  orders	  of	  the	  government.	  There	  seemed	  to	  be	  this	  idea	  of	  a	  corruption	  and	  pull	  for	  power	  that	  existed	  at	  the	  top	  that	  was	  to	  blame	  for	  all	  the	  problems	  they	  now	  faced.	  	  By	  placing	  the	  blame	  for	  all	  of	  the	  actual	  problematic	  behaviors	  and	  ideologies	  on	  the	  Party	  and	  playing	  up	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  answered	  to	  the	  Party,	  they	  were	  able	  to	  make	  the	  claim	  that	  they	  were	  just	  doing	  what	  they	  were	  told.	  It	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  	  younger	  sibling	  arguing	  that	  his	  older	  brother	  made	  him	  throw	  the	  ball	  inside	  and,	  therefore,	  his	  fault	  that	  the	  lamp	  is	  now	  broken.	  In	  essence,	  the	  act	  itself	  is	  bad,	  but	  they	  don’t	  see	  themselves	  as	  bad.	  	   From	  all	  of	  this	  data,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  a	  major	  split	  on	  what	  carrying	  out	  orders	  entails	  and	  where	  one	  is	  allowed	  to	  draw	  the	  line	  for	  oneself.	  The	  fact	  that	  this	  divide	  occurs	  in	  private	  deliberations	  after	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Germany	  is	  going	  to	  lose	  is	  quite	  interesting.	  It	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  a	  natural	  and	  potentially	  genuine	  quality	  of	  self-­‐preservation	  that	  this	  excuse	  provides	  to	  oneself	  that	  doesn’t	  require	  the	  interaction	  of	  others	  to	  be	  effective;	  however,	  that	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  there	  was	  no	  discussion	  between	  these	  generals	  on	  what	  benefits	  the	  topos	  of	  just	  following	  orders	  could	  provide	  in	  the	  public	  eye.	  In	  a	  conversation	  between	  Wildermuth7	  and	  Heim8,	  they	  discuss	  the	  possibility	  of	  using	  this	  topos	  as	  the	  party	  line	  in	  trials	  
                                                
7 Oberst Eberhard Wildermuth served in both WWI and WWII in which he was 
stationed all over. He was brought to Trent Park in November of 1944 and while 
there was described by the CSDIC (UK) as “fundamentally liberal but…a staunch 
German patriot [who was] violently opposed to the present regime.” He was 
particularly close to von der Heydte, Eberbach, and Heim while at Trent Park 
(Neitzel 319-320). 
8 Generalleutnant Ferdinand Heim entered the army in June of 1914. He was 
brought to Trent Park in September of 1944, but prior to this he was assessed as 
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regarding	  their	  guilt	  or	  innocence.	  	  Heim	  asks,	  "The	  only	  question	  is:	  what	  shall	  be	  our	  attitude	  when	  we	  are	  put	  before	  one	  of	  those	  Courts	  of	  Inquiry?”	  and	  continues	  with	  an	  idea;	  “In	  my	  opinion	  our	  conduct	  must	  be	  uniform,	  we	  must	  uphold	  the	  principle	  of	  only	  having	  carried	  out	  orders”	  (Nietzel	  224).	  He	  is	  aware	  of	  the	  benefits	  that	  utilizing	  this	  topos	  in	  a	  public	  setting	  will	  provide.	  And	  he	  understands	  that	  this	  will	  need	  to	  be	  a	  universal	  narrative	  in	  order	  to	  be	  effective,	  which	  prompts	  Heim	  to	  suggest	  that	  they	  	  “ought	  to	  discuss	  these	  matter	  at	  a	  larger	  gathering	  in	  order	  to	  create	  a	  basis	  of	  defense,	  and	  a	  fairly	  sound	  one	  at	  that"	  (Nietzel	  225).	   	  	   One	  of	  the	  more	  interesting	  things	  about	  this	  topos	  is	  how	  the	  generals	  use	  it	  to	  excuse	  themselves	  from	  the	  repudiation	  of	  the	  law,	  but	  truly	  do	  not	  see	  it	  as	  excusing	  their	  behavior	  morally.	  They	  believe	  that	  because	  they	  were	  doing	  nothing	  more	  than	  following	  orders	  they	  cannot	  be	  tried	  and	  punished,	  but	  nothing	  more	  than	  this.	  	  Wildermuth,	  a	  general	  who	  was	  given	  an	  order	  to	  “have	  a	  hundred	  [Serbs]	  shot	  for	  every	  German	  killed	  and	  fifty	  for	  every	  German	  wounded,	  and	  who	  chose	  to	  pass	  this	  order	  along	  stated	  in	  conversation	  with	  Heim,	  "I'll	  answer:	  'Well	  I	  had	  to,	  otherwise	  I'd	  have	  been	  shot.'	  That	  is	  my	  defense,	  but	  it	  doesn't	  excuse	  me	  morally"	  (Neitzel	  224).	  Here,	  we	  see	  a	  deeply	  entrenched	  utilization	  of	  compartmentalization,	  and	  an	  excellent	  example	  of	  the	  Nazi’s	  rhetorical	  strategy	  of	  exploiting	  people’s	  capacity	  to	  compartmentalize.	  	  
Public	  	   In	  the	  public	  setting	  in	  which	  he	  works	  to	  defend	  himself	  against	  accusations	  
                                                                                                                                            
having a “cool personality, difficult to penetrate” and as “need[ing] the occasional 
severe prod to get him going” (Neitzel 296). 
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of	  war	  crimes,	  Eichmann	  utilizes	  this	  topos	  of	  compartmentalization	  and	  ‘just	  following	  orders’	  in	  a	  bit	  more	  of	  a	  direct	  way.	  What	  is	  interesting	  here	  is,	  instead	  of	  seeing	  generals	  utilize	  this	  topos	  in	  their	  discussions	  of	  motivations	  privately	  and	  with	  others	  in	  the	  same	  situation,	  we	  see	  a	  man	  leaning	  heavily	  on	  a	  topos	  he	  believes	  has	  the	  best	  chance	  of	  saving	  his	  life.	  It	  seems	  as	  if	  this	  chain	  of	  command	  aspect	  of	  the	  compartmentalization	  topos	  is	  one	  of	  his	  primary	  strategies	  of	  defense.	  	   Eichmann	  claims	  that	  the	  Holocaust	  was	  not	  his	  idea,	  nor	  his	  responsibility.	  In	  order	  to	  back	  this	  argument	  up	  he	  often	  lays	  out	  a	  hierarchical	  map	  of	  those	  stationed	  above	  him	  in	  all	  situations	  by	  making	  quick	  statements	  such	  as	  “the	  Central	  Office	  for	  Jewish	  Emigration	  was	  a	  first	  in	  the	  German	  administrative	  machine”	  (Von	  Lang	  56).	  When	  asked	  about	  specific	  instances	  of	  his	  own	  involvement	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  recognizable	  pattern.	  He	  first	  states	  how	  horrible	  he	  thought	  whatever	  accusation	  was	  made	  to	  be,	  then	  states	  “I	  was	  given	  orders.”	  (Von	  Lang	  84).	  	  	   Whether	  it	  was	  a	  visit	  to	  Treblinka,	  or	  an	  instance	  of	  planning	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	  Holocaust	  such	  as	  organizing	  deportations	  to	  the	  death	  camps,	  Eichmann	  makes	  the	  same	  argument.	  He	  even	  uses	  this	  hierarchical	  topos	  to	  explain	  why	  he	  didn’t	  stop	  the	  deportation	  of	  Jews	  when	  confronted	  with	  the	  horrible	  conditions	  under	  which	  these	  deportations	  were	  taking	  place.	  Eichmann	  was	  read	  a	  report	  from	  Dr.	  Kastner	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Rescue	  Committee,	  who	  had	  met	  with	  Eichmann	  to	  discuss	  and	  negotiate	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  Jewish	  ghettos	  and	  deportation	  practices	  during	  the	  war.	  Dr.	  Kastner	  was	  met	  with	  what	  he	  depicts	  as	  a	  very	  harsh	  and	  unyielding	  “no”	  to	  his	  appeal	  for	  assistance	  that	  blatantly	  disregarded	  and	  showed	  no	  ounce	  of	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care	  for	  the	  people	  affected.	  Eichmann	  responds	  to	  this	  accusation	  by	  saying,	  “What	  I	  probably	  said	  was:	  I	  can't	  stop	  them,	  because	  I	  didn’t	  order	  them”	  (Von	  Lang	  208).	  It	  is	  especially	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Eichmann	  was	  unafraid	  to	  point	  fingers.	  He	  would	  often	  state,	  in	  order	  to	  build	  credibility,	  where	  his	  orders	  came	  from.	  He	  once	  offered,	  “I	  had	  to	  set	  up	  the	  guidelines	  for	  implementation	  [of	  forced	  “deportation”	  of	  Jews],	  because	  those	  were	  the	  Reichsführer’s	  orders”	  (Von	  Lang	  102).	  Though	  he	  is	  probably	  telling	  the	  truth	  in	  that	  he	  was	  given	  these	  orders,	  it	  is	  most	  definitely	  a	  post-­‐war	  strategy	  that	  he	  is	  intentionally	  deployed	  to	  give	  himself	  an	  alibi	  because	  as	  we	  know,	  he	  had	  been	  very	  eager	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  deport	  Jews	  at	  this	  time	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  was	  both	  an	  anti-­‐semite	  and	  saw	  it	  as	  a	  way	  to	  advance	  his	  career	  (Cesarani	  32-­‐33,	  57-­‐58).	  	   A	  lack	  of	  intention	  to	  question	  authority	  is	  clear	  in	  Eichmann’s	  statement,	  “The	  loyalty	  oath	  in	  itself	  called	  for	  unquestioning	  obedience.	  So	  naturally	  we	  had	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  laws	  and	  regulations”	  (Von	  Lang	  124).	  This	  is	  an	  obvious	  example	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  Nazis’	  propensity	  for	  exploiting	  one’s	  ability	  to	  compartmentalize	  morality	  and	  duty.	  We	  see	  the	  seriousness	  with	  which	  Eichmann	  was	  able	  to	  justify	  his	  behavior	  with	  the	  statement	  “I	  regarded	  my	  work	  as	  a	  binding	  duty”	  and	  though	  we	  do	  not	  necessarily	  see	  a	  division	  between	  his	  moral	  code	  at	  the	  time	  and	  his	  definition	  of	  duty	  now,	  we	  do	  see	  this	  clash	  between	  what	  he	  claims	  as	  his	  morality	  in	  these	  interrogations	  and	  what	  he	  claims	  to	  be	  his	  duty	  (Von	  Lang	  156).	  This	  is	  where	  we	  see	  Eichmann	  employ	  the	  strategy	  of	  compartmentalization.	  	   However,	  we	  also	  see	  Eichmann	  deal	  with	  the	  question	  of	  why	  he	  did	  not	  revolt	  during	  the	  war	  in	  these	  interrogations.	  It	  seems	  that	  for	  Eichmann,	  loyalty	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was	  embedded	  not	  just	  in	  his	  own	  system	  of	  beliefs	  but	  in	  those	  of	  all	  that	  surrounded	  him.	  This	  meant	  that,	  for	  Eichmann,	  no	  matter	  what	  it	  may	  be	  that	  he	  wanted	  to	  do,	  he	  claimed	  to	  feel	  forced	  to	  continue	  forward	  due	  to	  what	  is,	  at	  its	  essence,	  peer	  pressure.	  Eichmann	  states,	  “I	  had	  orders	  to	  deport.	  And	  when	  my	  colleague	  Wisliceny	  writes	  in	  his	  confessions	  that	  there	  were	  ways	  of	  circumventing	  Hitler’s	  orders.	  I’d	  be	  glad	  to	  know	  what	  those	  ways	  were.	  I	  say:	  There	  was	  one	  way	  and	  only	  one	  way:	  to	  take	  a	  pistol	  and	  shoot	  yourself.	  That’s	  obvious.	  I	  didn’t.”	  (Von	  Lang	  197).	  Though	  this	  scenario	  ends	  with	  death	  the	  only	  option,	  the	  point	  here	  is	  not	  whether	  there	  would	  be	  punishment	  but	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  rebellion	  would	  be	  futile	  or	  not.	  He	  later	  states,	  “I	  never	  noticed	  any	  resistance,	  either	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Wisliceny	  or	  of	  Krumey.”	  (Von	  Lang	  198).	  Eichmann,	  here,	  is	  claiming	  that	  he	  was	  unaware	  of	  any	  of	  sort	  of	  internal	  resistance	  and	  is	  making	  the	  argument	  that	  his	  unawareness	  made	  it	  seem	  like	  a	  impossibility	  to	  him	  and	  this	  is	  why	  he	  did	  not	  even	  try	  to	  revolt.	  This	  is	  further	  evidence	  of	  the	  topos	  of	  compartmentalization.	  Though	  Eichmann	  sees	  outside	  resistance,	  he	  is	  claiming	  that	  his	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  of	  internal	  resistance	  is	  what	  is	  key.	  Again,	  we	  see	  Eichmann	  here	  create	  a	  dichotomy	  in	  which	  each	  sphere	  that	  he	  has	  constructed	  for	  this	  interrogation	  has	  its	  own	  rules.	  	  	   Eichmann	  utilizes	  this	  compartmentalization	  and	  the	  aspect	  of	  ‘just	  following	  orders’	  to	  his	  advantage.	  He	  does	  an	  excellent	  job	  of	  creating	  these	  scenes	  of	  his	  own	  disgust	  by	  utilizing	  pathos	  to	  manipulate	  the	  audience	  into	  agreement.	  	  He	  presents	  bold	  statements	  regarding	  his	  emotional	  state	  at	  the	  time	  of	  horrific	  orders	  being	  given,	  and	  compartmentalizes	  these	  emotional	  states	  against	  his	  duty	  of	  following	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the	  order.	  At	  one	  point,	  he	  states,	  “’The	  Führer	  has	  ordered	  physical	  extermination.’…I’d	  never	  thought	  of	  a	  …	  of	  such	  a	  thing,	  of	  that	  sort	  of	  violent	  solution”	  (Von	  Lang	  75).	  This	  paints	  Eichmann	  in	  the	  best	  possible	  light.	  It	  paints	  him	  as	  morally	  upright	  and	  yet	  also	  leaves	  space	  open	  for	  him	  to	  have	  committed	  these	  atrocities	  without	  rebuke.	  Eichmann	  is	  stating	  that	  he	  did	  nothing	  but	  follow	  orders,	  which	  he	  seems	  to	  believe,	  as	  many	  do	  in	  different	  contexts,	  holds	  a	  sort	  of	  moral	  righteousness	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  In	  another	  instance,	  Eichmann	  is	  describing	  his	  experience	  seeing	  a	  truck	  full	  of	  Jews	  being	  transported.	  When	  asked	  specifics	  he	  remembers	  the	  horrifying.	  He	  describes	  it	  as	  “the	  most	  horrible	  sight	  I	  had	  seen	  in	  all	  my	  life”	  (Von	  Lang	  77).	  It	  is	  a	  description	  that	  reads	  true	  to	  other	  accounts	  of	  the	  Holocaust	  given	  by	  those	  who	  saw,	  but	  had	  no	  power	  to	  rebel.	  	  However,	  Eichmann	  had	  the	  power.	  Yet	  when	  asked,	  “Did	  you	  report	  on	  this	  in	  writing?”	  Eichmann	  responds	  with	  “No,	  I	  couldn’t	  do	  that.	  I	  was	  expressly	  forbidden	  to;	  by	  Heydrich,	  I	  believe.”	  (Von	  Lang	  78).	  This	  massive	  ability	  to	  present	  an	  almost	  completely	  compartmentalized	  self	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  what	  Hitler	  had	  shown	  in	  his	  rhetoric,	  and	  it	  is	  with	  good	  reason	  that	  Eichmann	  might	  try	  to	  employ	  this	  strategy	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  himself	  from	  the	  death	  penalty.	  	   No	  audience	  is	  going	  to	  disagree	  or	  not	  connect	  in	  some	  way	  with	  this	  depiction	  of	  disgust	  with	  what	  are	  objectively	  horrific	  crimes.	  It	  is	  inherently	  more	  believable	  that	  a	  human	  being	  would	  have	  such	  an	  emotional	  and	  disgusted	  reaction	  to	  such	  horrific	  mistreatment	  of	  another	  person	  than	  it	  is	  that	  this	  person	  would	  present	  as	  perfectly	  calm	  and	  normal.	  It	  is	  this	  normalcy	  of	  his	  argument	  that	  makes	  it	  so	  hard	  to	  refute.	  As	  human	  beings	  we	  have	  a	  tendency	  to	  see	  ourselves	  in	  others’	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positions	  when	  thinking	  about	  their	  actions,	  and,	  for	  most	  people,	  it	  is	  this	  reaction	  of	  disgust	  that	  rings	  more	  true	  than	  anything	  else.	  In	  this	  instance,	  Eichmann	  is	  able	  to	  get	  more	  people	  on	  his	  side.	  By	  creating	  this	  narrative	  of	  his	  own	  disgust,	  Eichmann	  may	  have	  hoped	  to	  create	  a	  relationship	  with	  his	  audience,	  a	  relatability	  that	  would	  allow	  him	  to	  convince	  them	  of	  other	  things,	  not	  least	  of	  which	  being	  his	  own	  innocence.	  He	  knows	  he	  is	  too	  far	  up	  in	  command	  to	  play	  the	  victim,	  but	  he	  utilizes	  aspects	  of	  this	  strategy	  to	  grasp	  any	  little	  thread	  of	  connection	  he	  can	  believably	  create	  between	  himself	  and	  his	  audience	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  sympathy	  and	  save	  himself	  from	  punishment,	  in	  this	  case,	  to	  save	  himself	  from	  death.	  	   In	  his	  attempt	  to	  utilize	  the	  topos	  of	  following	  orders,	  Eichmann	  also	  makes	  sure	  that	  he	  does	  not	  deny	  his	  involvement	  to	  an	  unbelievable	  degree	  in	  order	  to	  remain	  a	  sympathetic	  figure.	  He	  has	  crafted	  a	  version	  of	  himself	  who	  was	  disgusted	  by	  the	  orders	  he	  received	  and	  yet	  also	  carried	  them	  out,	  so	  now	  he	  must	  explain	  to	  his	  audience	  how	  he	  reconciles	  these	  two	  things	  within	  himself.	  In	  yet	  another	  effort	  to	  conjure	  sympathy	  with	  this	  topos,	  Eichmann	  martyrs	  himself	  through	  the	  use	  of	  this	  Nazi	  topos	  of	  compartmentalization.	  He	  takes	  moral	  responsibility	  without	  taking	  punishable	  responsibility.	  	  He	  states,	  “I’m	  not	  calling	  anyone	  else	  to	  account	  for	  the	  evacuations.	  I	  was	  responsible.	  I’m	  ready	  to	  take	  my	  punishment.	  I’m	  not	  short	  on	  courage.	  Of	  course,	  it’s	  a…	  sad	  kind	  of	  courage	  I	  need	  now.	  But	  in	  those	  days	  I	  had	  the	  gumption	  to	  say	  “Yes,	  sir!”	  and	  today	  I	  have	  the	  gumption	  to	  say:	  “All	  right.	  I’m	  ready.	  Here’s	  my	  head…ready	  to	  go	  where	  it	  belongs”	  (Von	  Lang	  97).	  	   This	  is	  an	  excellent	  representation	  of	  an	  adoption	  of	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Reich’s	  rhetoric.	  Hitler	  played	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  people	  to	  compartmentalize.	  As	  we	  discussed	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in	  regards	  to	  the	  generals,	  this	  compartmentalization	  is	  what,	  consciously	  or	  unconsciously,	  allowed	  many	  of	  the	  captured	  generals	  to	  justify	  their	  actions.	  They	  make	  the	  claim	  that	  yes,	  they	  may	  have	  been	  morally	  wrong,	  but	  that	  their	  actions	  are	  not	  punishable.	  They	  try	  to	  explain	  that	  morality	  and	  the	  actions	  they	  took	  are	  not	  equivalent	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  were	  under	  orders	  to	  take	  such	  action.	  Eichmann	  admitted	  “I	  am	  guilty	  of	  complicity,”	  and	  I	  think	  this	  is	  an	  excellent	  example	  of	  this	  compartmentalized	  moral	  versus	  duty	  driven	  mindset	  (Von	  Lang	  104).	  Even	  if,	  morally,	  he	  sees	  himself	  as	  responsible	  for	  these	  deaths,	  he	  truly	  seems	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  only	  thing	  he	  can	  be	  guilty	  of	  in	  a	  court	  of	  law	  is	  complicity	  because	  he	  was	  just	  following	  orders.	  Whether,	  as	  we	  see	  here	  with	  Eichmann,	  he	  is	  making	  this	  argument	  either	  consciously	  or	  unconsciously,	  we	  see	  an	  excellent	  example	  of	  a	  traceable	  ideology	  between	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  and	  those	  who	  served	  him.	  	   	  
   
36 
Perceived	  Existential	  Threat	  
	  
Private	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  topos	  of	  perceived	  existential	  threat,	  the	  generals	  that	  were	  held	  at	  Trent	  Park	  provide	  us	  with	  a	  lot	  of	  evidence	  of	  the	  adoption	  of	  this	  feature	  of	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric.	  This	  ingrained	  sense	  of	  fear	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people,	  this	  common,	  single	  enemy	  as	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  motivations	  of	  the	  Reich	  is	  exemplified	  in	  a	  quote	  by	  captured	  general	  Ramcke9:	  One	  day	  history	  will	  say	  the	  Führer	  was	  right	  in	  recognizing	  this	  great	  Jewish	  danger	  threatening	  all	  nations	  and	  in	  realizing	  the	  Jewish	  communist	  threat	  to	  Europe	  from	  the	  East.	  At	  one	  time	  it	  was	  Genghis	  Khan	  and	  at	  another	  Attila.	  This	  time	  it	  is	  the	  Jewish	  Bolshevism	  spreading	  over	  Europe	  from	  the	  Asiatic	  steppes,	  a	  tide	  we	  had	  to	  stem.	  Perhaps	  future	  history	  will	  realize	  it	  and	  that	  France,	  Belgium,	  and	  Germany	  quarreled	  among	  themselves,	  with	  England	  at	  the	  back	  of	  it	  all	  because	  of	  their	  petty	  opposing	  interests,	  on	  account	  of	  a	  ridiculous	  little	  Czechoslovakia	  and	  Sudetenland	  and	  a	  lousy	  Danzig	  Corridor	  and	  such	  rubbish,	  and	  that	  we	  failed	  to	  realize	  the	  threat	  from	  the	  east.	  (Neitzel	  130)	  
                                                
9 General Der Fallschirmtruppen Bernhard Ramcke entered the navy in 1905, 
transferred to the army in March of 1919, and again transferred to Luftwaffe 
paratroop arm in August of 1940, during WWII. He was held at Trent Park from 
September of 1944 until April of 1945. He was then transferred to the French 
who imprisoned him for various war crimes committed at Brest. The CSDIC (UK) 
described Ramcke while he was at Trent Park as “inordinately vain…ambitious, 
ruthless yet naïve, [and] an opportunist” and as having “a most extensive 
knowledge of distorted history” (Neitzel 309). 
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Even	  in	  the	  last	  few	  months	  of	  the	  war,	  when	  Germany	  is	  clearly	  losing,	  this	  belief	  of	  the	  Jewish	  enemy	  remains.	  This	  is	  not	  something	  that	  waivers,	  which	  suggests	  a	  truly	  lasting	  and	  powerful	  belief	  in	  it	  by	  those	  who	  make	  such	  claims.	  We	  see	  this	  topos	  repeated	  over	  and	  over	  again	  by	  the	  captured	  generals	  at	  Trent	  Park.	  Crüwell,	  one	  of	  these	  generals,	  blatantly	  states,	  “It	  is	  the	  Jews	  who	  want	  to	  destroy	  us	  down	  to	  the	  last	  man.	  They	  know	  that	  the	  National	  Socialist	  doctrine	  will	  spread	  all	  over	  the	  world	  and	  they	  want	  to	  save	  themselves	  by	  hook	  or	  by	  crook	  from	  their	  inevitable	  extinction”	  (Neitzel	  79).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   In	  a	  discussion	  about	  Himmler’s	  reason	  for	  ordering	  the	  extermination	  of	  all	  of	  the	  Jews,	  a	  general	  named	  Meyer10	  states	  that	  the	  reason	  Himmler	  did	  it	  was	  because	  of	  his	  loyalty	  and	  faithfulness	  to	  Hitler	  and	  his	  orders.	  Meyer	  seemed	  to	  think	  Himmler	  ordering	  such	  a	  thing	  was	  inevitable	  because	  “The	  Führer	  used	  to	  say:	  ‘Should	  the	  Jews	  succeed	  once	  again	  in	  involving	  Europe	  in	  a	  war,	  it	  will	  not	  mean	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  German	  people,	  but	  the	  annihilation	  of	  the	  Jewish	  race”	  (Neitzel	  199).	  Here	  we	  see	  an	  example	  of	  Hitler’s	  rhetorical	  topos	  of	  this	  Jewish	  threat	  being	  claimed	  to	  be	  directly	  responsible	  for	  the	  actions	  of	  one	  of	  his	  generals.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   We	  can	  even	  see	  this	  topos	  translated	  onto	  ‘enemies’	  other	  than	  Jews.	  This	  common	  singular	  enemy	  is	  expanded	  to	  encompass	  the	  East	  as	  a	  whole	  as	  a	  “Jewish”	  threat.	  In	  these	  transcripts	  from	  Trent	  Park	  we	  hear	  a	  captured	  general	  state	  his	  
                                                
10 SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Waffen-SS Kurt Meyer entered the SS 
in October of 1931. He was held at Trent Park from November of 1944 until April 
of 1945. In December of 1945 he was sentenced to death but this was then 
downgraded to life in prison, and he was eventually released in September of 
1954. He was assessed by the SS in April of 1943 as having a “fanatical fighting 
spirit” (Neitzel 306). 
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concerns	  in	  regards	  to	  talk	  of	  a	  partition	  plan	  and	  the	  Russians	  gaining	  control	  over	  the	  land	  east	  of	  the	  Elbe	  river:	  	  "We	  know	  that	  the	  Russians	  can	  be	  just	  as	  ruthless	  with	  people	  as	  they	  would	  be	  with	  the	  clearing	  of	  a	  forest"	  (Neitzel	  119).	  	  This	  statement	  that	  is	  stated	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war	  is	  indicative	  of	  the	  intense	  ingrained	  bias	  against	  those	  associated	  with	  this	  ‘Jewish	  threat’.	  These	  external	  groups	  are	  manipulated	  to	  add	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  omnipresent	  threat	  to	  the	  German	  Aryan	  man,	  and	  nothing	  else	  is	  taken	  into	  consideration.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   The	  original	  topos	  of	  this	  perceived	  existential	  ‘Jewish	  threat’	  to	  the	  German	  race	  was	  transformed	  as	  the	  war	  went	  on	  and	  the	  Holocaust	  took	  place.	  After	  these	  atrocities	  began	  this	  perceived	  existential	  threat	  did	  not	  decrease	  as	  one	  might	  expect,	  instead	  it	  increased.	  There	  was	  an	  idea	  that	  since	  the	  Jewish	  population	  was	  treated	  so	  poorly,	  were	  they	  to	  become	  free	  once	  again,	  they	  would	  want	  revenge	  and	  this	  seemed	  to	  pose	  an	  even	  more	  worrisome	  threat	  that	  furthered	  the	  topos	  of	  a	  perceived	  existential	  threat.	  In	  a	  particularly	  awful	  conversation	  between	  a	  few	  generals	  at	  Trent	  Park	  who	  had	  been	  witnesses	  to	  and	  participants	  in	  the	  killing	  of	  Jews,	  a	  man	  named	  Rothkirch11	  stated,	  "If	  those	  people,	  the	  Jews,	  come	  to	  the	  helm	  and	  take	  revenge,	  it	  will	  of	  course	  be	  terrible”	  (Neitzel	  221).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   This	  common	  element	  of	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  perceived	  existential	  threat	  seems	  to	  be	  sufficiently	  found	  in	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  Hitler’s	  generals	  to	  
                                                
11 General der Kavallerie Edwin Graf von Rothkirch und Trach entered the army 
in March of 1908. He was held in Trent Park from March of 1945 to July of 1945. 
According to the CSDIC (UK), he was “the typical Prussian regular officer 
aristocrat” while at Trent Park, and he portrayed himself as “violently anti-Nazi” to 
the allied officers with whom he came into contact which the CSDIC (UK) 
attributed to “his attitude that his class [had] been ousted by upstarts from its 
rightful place in the German sun.” He was described by a fellow prisoner as 
“lacking the least conscience” (Neitzel 311). 
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suggest	  some	  sort	  of	  influence	  was	  occurring	  either	  from	  the	  Hitler	  himself	  or	  from	  a	  common	  cultural	  belief	  that	  resulted	  in	  a	  meeting	  of	  minds	  between	  Hitler	  and	  his	  generals.	  This	  perception	  of	  the	  threat	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people,	  as	  correlated	  to	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric,	  is	  extraordinarily	  important,	  as	  it	  is	  responsible	  for	  much	  of	  the	  private	  rationalization	  of	  many	  war	  crimes.	  	  	  
Public	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Unlike	  in	  the	  private	  forum	  in	  which	  the	  captured	  generals	  expressed	  their	  conviction	  in	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  Jewish	  people	  posed	  an	  ultimate	  threat	  to	  the	  German	  people	  and	  thus	  validated	  the	  actions	  they	  took	  against	  these	  people,	  no	  matter	  how	  atrocious,	  Eichmann	  in	  this	  public	  forum,	  after	  the	  war,	  and	  in	  which	  he	  is	  fighting	  for	  his	  life	  does	  not	  utilize	  this	  topos	  of	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  as	  an	  argument.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   On	  various	  occasions,	  Eichmann	  actually	  denies	  any	  belief	  in	  this	  threat	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people.	  Less	  reads	  him	  a	  report	  in	  which	  he	  is	  quoted	  as	  having	  said,	  “’Typical	  of	  the	  total	  incapacity	  of	  Jews	  to	  maintain	  an	  orderly	  economy	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  Jerusalem	  alone	  there	  are	  said	  to	  be	  forty	  Jewish	  banks,	  which	  live	  by	  cheating	  their	  fellow	  Jews’”	  (Von	  Lang	  44).	  Eichmann	  fervently	  denies	  ever	  saying	  such	  a	  thing.	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  common	  thread	  throughout	  his	  interrogation.	  He	  refuses	  to	  say	  anything	  bad	  about	  the	  Jewish	  people	  or	  admit	  to	  ever	  believing	  such	  things.	  For	  Eichmann’s	  argument,	  everything	  remotely	  bad	  he	  did,	  he	  did	  because	  of	  an	  order	  not	  because	  of	  an	  ideology.	  He	  directly	  says	  to	  Less,	  “I	  am	  neither	  a	  Jew-­‐hater	  nor	  an	  anti-­‐Semite…I	  think	  I	  said	  it	  to	  everyone”	  (Von	  Lang	  149).	  It	  must	  be	  mentioned	  that	  Eichmann	  is	  on	  trial	  for	  his	  life	  in	  Jerusalem,	  so	  for	  him	  to	  say	  any	  differently	  would	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be	  in	  direct	  opposition	  to	  his	  case.	  It	  is	  this	  choice	  to	  so	  strongly	  rely	  on	  a	  claim	  of	  not	  being	  anti-­‐semitic	  despite	  the	  resounding	  evidence	  that	  tells	  us	  he	  was	  an	  anti-­‐semite	  that	  gives	  us	  such	  strong	  evidence	  of	  the	  topoi	  of	  opportunism	  which	  we	  will	  get	  to	  later.	  However,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  perceived	  existential	  threat	  we	  see	  Eichmann	  claim	  that	  throughout	  the	  war,	  throughout	  every	  order	  for	  deportation,	  every	  order	  for	  extermination,	  every	  order	  for	  every	  horrible	  crime	  committed	  against	  the	  Jewish	  people	  who	  were	  outrightly	  and	  openly	  hated	  by	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Nazi	  party	  and	  who	  were	  consistently	  labeled	  as	  the	  enemy	  of	  the	  German	  people	  in	  the	  doctrine	  of	  the	  Nazi	  regime,	  the	  only	  reason	  he	  gave	  those	  orders	  was	  because	  the	  orders	  were	  given	  to	  him	  to	  do	  so.	  This	  is	  just	  not	  convincing	  given	  all	  of	  the	  evidence	  to	  the	  contrary.	  However,	  though	  it	  may	  not	  be	  convincing,	  it	  is	  at	  least	  not	  directly	  incriminating.	  Were	  he	  to	  admit	  that	  he	  was	  swayed	  and	  that	  he	  did	  believe	  that	  the	  Jewish	  people	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  his	  nation	  or	  to	  his	  “race,”	  he	  would	  be	  admitting	  to	  a	  motive	  and	  thus	  incriminating	  himself.	  On	  top	  of	  this,	  he	  would	  lose	  any	  small	  amount	  of	  sympathy	  he	  was	  able	  to	  gain	  by	  framing	  himself	  as	  the	  victim	  of	  his	  superiors	  orders.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   I	  cannot	  make	  any	  claims	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  Eichmann	  is	  telling	  the	  truth	  based	  on	  this	  evidence,	  but	  David	  Cesarani	  in	  a	  book	  entitled	  Becoming	  Hitler	  can	  make	  a	  claim	  as	  to	  Eichmann’s	  anti	  semitism.	  According	  to	  Cesarani,	  Eichmann,	  growing	  up	  in	  Austria,	  would	  have	  been	  surrounded	  by	  anti	  semitism	  (32).	  Though	  he	  makes	  only	  minor	  claims	  as	  to	  Eichmann’s	  anti	  semetism	  prior	  to	  the	  war,	  he	  emphasizes	  that	  by	  mid-­‐1942	  “Eichmann’s	  attitude	  towards	  the	  Jews	  had	  assumed	  a	  cold	  inhumanity”	  beyond	  what	  was	  normal	  for	  a	  “warrior	  towards	  an	  enemy”	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(Cesarani	  157).	  Cesarani	  notes	  that	  “[Eichmann’s]	  species	  of	  anti	  semitism	  was	  so	  radical	  that	  it	  assumed	  buisness	  like	  features,	  like	  the	  pose	  of	  a	  doctor	  facing	  a	  disease.	  Doctors	  don’t	  get	  emotional	  about	  cancer	  cells.	  Eichmann	  didn’t	  get	  sentimental	  about	  Jews”	  and	  Eichmann	  ultimately	  admitted	  to	  this	  Nazi	  view	  of	  the	  Jews	  as	  a	  germ	  or	  a	  disease	  that	  threatened	  Germany	  in	  his	  trial	  (157).	  	  Given	  Eichmann’s	  deep	  anti	  semetism,	  omitting	  such	  a	  topos	  would	  not	  only	  be	  beneficial	  but	  necessary.	  Thus,	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  do	  not	  see	  Eichmann	  repeat	  this	  topos	  neither	  proves	  or	  disproves	  that	  he	  was	  affected	  by	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  of	  this	  perceived	  existential	  threat	  of	  the	  Jew.	   	  




Private	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   The	  generals	  held	  at	  Trent	  Park	  did	  their	  fair	  share	  of	  complaining	  about	  the	  conditions	  that	  Germany	  was	  in	  politically	  after	  World	  War	  I	  and	  before	  the	  start	  of	  Hitler’s	  rule,	  and	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  strong	  correlation	  between	  the	  topos	  of	  opportunism	  seen	  in	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  Adolf	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Reich	  itself	  and	  these	  generals	  use	  of	  opportunism.	  There	  is	  a	  sense	  of	  always	  having	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  say	  to	  the	  right	  people	  to	  get	  them	  on	  your	  side,	  and	  this	  is	  seen	  in	  the	  general’s	  discussion	  of	  Germany’s	  political	  and	  economic	  state	  prior	  to	  the	  war	  and	  the	  promise	  of	  a	  better	  future	  wanted	  and	  needed	  by	  all.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  everything	  that	  was	  claimed	  by	  the	  Nazi's	  on	  this	  subject	  was	  a	  blatant	  lie,	  but	  rather	  that	  the	  things	  they	  said	  to	  relate	  to	  others	  were	  opportunistically	  applied	  to	  increase	  their	  persuasive	  power.	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Reich	  were	  experts	  at	  becoming	  the	  thing	  that	  any	  specific	  group	  of	  people	  needed	  at	  any	  given	  time	  and	  we	  see	  that	  chameleon-­‐like	  quality	  repeated	  in	  these	  captured	  General’s	  rationalizations	  for	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  war.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Most	  prominently	  this	  is	  seen	  in	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  exploitation	  of	  Germany’s	  downtrodden	  attitude,	  political	  and	  economic	  state	  prior	  to	  the	  war,	  and	  perceived	  ‘right’	  to	  fight	  back	  against	  WWI	  reparations.	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Reich	  painted	  Germany	  as	  a	  victim	  of	  World	  War	  I,	  and	  we	  see	  these	  generals	  repeat	  this	  point.	  Crüwell,	  a	  German	  general	  being	  held	  at	  Trent	  Park	  states,	  "Don't	  forget	  that	  in	  the	  first	  place	  we	  were	  swindled	  by	  those	  miserable	  Fourteen	  Points"	  (Neitzel	  68).	  The	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war	  here	  and	  all	  the	  actions	  taken	  thereafter	  are	  rationalized	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  perceived	  mistreatment	  of	  Germany	  by	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  after	  World	  War	  I.	  On	  top	  of	  this	  statement,	  Krause12,	  in	  having	  this	  discussion	  asks	  the	  question,	  “But	  why	  is	  it	  that	  Germany	  always	  has	  been	  hated	  by	  all	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world?"	  (Neitzel	  68).	  This	  is	  indicative	  of	  the	  Reich’s	  ability	  to	  utilize	  the	  power	  of	  the	  citizens’	  and	  generals’	  feelings	  of	  insufficiency	  and	  unpopularity	  to	  push	  their	  own	  agenda:	  war.	  The	  German	  people	  did	  not	  want	  war	  initially,	  but	  were	  happy	  with	  it	  as	  long	  as	  they	  were	  winning.	  They	  were	  understandably	  weary	  of	  any	  such	  thing	  after	  World	  War	  I,	  but	  this	  need	  to	  be	  free	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Versailles	  was	  used	  against	  them.	  As	  one	  German	  general	  named	  Broich13	  stated,	  “We	  obviously	  all	  wanted	  to	  free	  ourselves	  from	  the	  Versailles	  Treaty	  and	  see	  a	  free	  Germany	  reinstated,	  but	  never–	  I	  remember	  the	  time	  when	  everyone	  was	  saying:	  ‘Heavens,	  a	  war	  would	  be	  the	  greatest	  possible	  madness!’	  I	  am	  quite	  pleased	  to	  be	  here	  for	  the	  time	  being!”	  (Neitzel	  247).	  The	  generals	  captured	  and	  held	  at	  Trent	  Park	  seem	  to	  ascribe	  this	  to	  the	  placement	  of	  Germany	  in	  the	  victim	  role	  after	  WWI.	  This	  is	  significant	  evidence	  of	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Reich’s	  rhetorical	  prowess	  in	  this	  topos	  and	  evidence	  for	  how	  they	  
                                                
12 Generalmajor Fritz Krause entered the army in November of 1913. He was 
stationed in North Africa, and held prisoner of war at Trent Park from May of 
1943 until September of 1944. Rommel described him as having a “positive 
attitude to National Socialism, and described by the CSDIC (UK) during his time 
at Trent Park as “a pleasant rather unintelligent man, [and] anti-Nazi” (Neitzel 
303-304). 
13 Generalleutnant Friedrich (Fritz) Freiherr von Broich entered the army in July 
of 1914 and was consistently praised by those above him. He was held at Trent 
Park starting in June of 1943 where CSDIC (UK) described him as having a 
broader perspective than many of the other generals due to his substantial 
travels around Europe and as “anti-Nazi, defeatist and monarchist.” This anti-
Nazism was matched by a deeply entrenched hatred of communism. It is 
reported that in correspondence with his wife, she warned him to be more careful 
in stating his anti-Nazi opinions” (Neitzel 283-284). 
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utilized	  this	  topos	  to	  get	  Germany	  into	  a	  war	  it	  did	  not	  necessarily	  want	  to	  be	  in.	  There	  was	  a	  sense	  from	  some	  that	  this	  political	  opportunism	  was	  the	  only	  way	  to	  handle	  the	  solution:	  "Today	  of	  course	  one	  can	  say	  -­‐-­‐	  as	  quite	  a	  number	  here	  are	  doing-­‐-­‐	  that	  we	  should	  never	  have	  started	  the	  war	  but,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  how	  else	  were	  we	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  the	  Versailles	  Treaty?"	  (Neitzel	  118-­‐119).	  There	  is	  a	  repetition	  of	  this	  ultimately	  political	  motivation	  behind	  the	  war	  seen	  here.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	  topos	  also	  evolved	  to	  fit	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  later	  war	  in	  which	  it	  began	  to	  become	  clear	  that	  Germany	  would	  lose	  again.	  The	  political	  motivation	  to	  continue	  the	  war	  because	  of	  Germany’s	  perceived	  victimization	  after	  WWI	  is	  a	  continuation	  of	  this	  focus	  on	  the	  post-­‐WWI	  conditions	  in	  Germany	  as	  motivation	  for	  the	  start	  of	  the	  war.	  Heyking14,	  one	  of	  the	  generals	  captured	  stated,	  "We've	  experienced	  the	  'fourteenpoints'	  once,	  we	  either	  die	  or	  -­‐-­‐...Either	  we	  shall	  die,	  or	  they	  will	  collapse	  in	  the	  process	  too"	  (Neitzel	  122).	  This	  is	  further	  rhetorical	  evidence	  of	  the	  power	  of	  the	  topos	  of	  political	  opportunism.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   With	  this	  topos	  we	  see	  political	  motives	  being	  placed	  on	  a	  people	  that	  did	  not	  want	  to	  see	  a	  repeat	  of	  WWI	  and	  who	  were	  weary	  of	  going	  back	  to	  war	  initially.	  We	  see	  evidence	  of	  an	  encoded	  need	  to	  become	  the	  victor	  rather	  than	  the	  victim.	  	  This	  was	  also	  an	  element	  of	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Reich’s	  rhetoric.	  They	  were	  able	  to	  politically	  manipulate	  a	  situation	  into	  a	  need	  for	  war	  and	  these	  complaints	  are	  an	  example	  of	  that.	  
                                                
14 Generalleutnant Rüdiger von Heyking entered the army in March of 1914 and 
transferred to the Luftwaffe in April of 1934. He was taken to Trent Park in 
September of 1944 where he was described by the CSDIC (UK) as being 
“cooperative,” believing Germany to have already lost the war, and feeling 
“disillusioned and disgusted by the commands of Higher HQ” (Neitzel 298-299). 
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   Another	  thing	  we	  must	  look	  at	  in	  regards	  to	  testing	  this	  hypothesis	  of	  opportunism	  is	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  see	  a	  pattern	  of	  the	  people	  who	  believe	  the	  war	  to	  be	  lost	  to	  also	  be	  the	  people	  who	  are	  more	  critical	  of	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Nazis.	  Within	  Trent	  Park	  there	  were	  two	  major	  cliques.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  cliques	  generally	  leant	  towards	  a	  more	  critical	  attitude	  of	  Hitler	  and	  the	  regime	  and	  were	  often	  described	  as	  “anti-­‐Nazi”	  by	  those	  who	  secretly	  monitored	  their	  conversations	  (Neitzel	  30-­‐37).	  This	  group	  was	  led	  by	  Thoma,	  and	  was	  also	  a	  group	  described	  by	  Neitzel	  to	  have	  “considered	  the	  war	  lost”	  (37).	  The	  other	  big	  group	  at	  Trent	  Park	  was	  led	  by	  Crüwell	  and	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  “Nazi	  clique”	  by	  the	  those	  listening	  in	  (Neitzel	  30-­‐37).	  Neitzel	  also	  made	  a	  note	  that	  this	  group	  “though	  critical	  of	  the	  war	  situation,	  considered	  it	  by	  no	  means	  hopeless”	  (37).	  We	  can	  see	  evidence	  of	  this	  connection	  in	  the	  generals	  conversations	  as	  well.	  	   Thoma,	  who	  was	  described	  as	  “violently	  anti-­‐Nazi”	  	  during	  his	  time	  at	  Trent	  Park	  stated	  in	  September	  of	  1943,	  that	  “the	  collapse	  of	  Germany	  is	  inevitable”	  and	  that	  he	  had	  “been	  expecting	  it”	  (Neitzel	  79).	  Broich,	  another	  member	  of	  this	  anti-­‐Nazi	  clique	  stated	  in	  June	  of	  1943	  that	  “our	  [the	  German’s]	  position	  is	  hopeless,	  there	  is	  no	  sense	  in	  carrying	  on	  the	  war	  any	  longer”	  (Neitzel	  74).	  Another	  prominent	  member	  of	  this	  anti-­‐Nazi	  group	  used	  the	  phrase	  “once	  the	  war	  is	  lost”	  in	  September	  of	  1944	  and	  with	  this	  phrase	  spoke	  to	  his	  belief	  in	  the	  inevitability	  of	  defeat.	  This	  is	  all	  contrasted	  with	  the	  statements	  made	  by	  those	  in	  the	  pro-­‐Nazi	  clique.	  Crüwell,	  the	  leader	  of	  this	  group,	  in	  discussing	  the	  benefits	  of	  monarchy	  stated	  that	  he	  only	  thought	  it	  could	  be	  possible	  “is	  we	  were	  to	  lose	  the	  war	  completely,	  and	  I	  set	  no	  store	  by	  that”	  (Neitzel	  67).	  Here	  we	  see	  a	  stark	  contrast	  to	  those	  in	  the	  anti-­‐Nazi	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clique.	  In	  June	  of	  1943,	  Crüwell	  was	  still	  holding	  on	  to	  this	  belief	  that	  Germany	  could	  win	  the	  war.	  He	  stated	  “I	  find	  it	  so	  unseemly	  to	  paint	  everything	  in	  its	  worst	  colours	  now…I	  don’t	  think	  that	  things	  are	  as	  serious	  or	  as	  desperate	  as	  all	  that”	  (Neitzel	  75).	  Another	  one	  of	  the	  generals	  in	  this	  clique,	  was	  also	  optimist	  about	  the	  prospects	  of	  the	  war.	  In	  September	  of	  1943,	  he	  stated	  “I	  believe	  that	  we	  shall	  clear	  out	  of	  Italy	  according	  to	  plan.”	  This	  contrast	  between	  how	  the	  generals	  who	  are	  pro-­‐Nazi	  and	  anti-­‐Nazi	  see	  the	  prospects	  of	  the	  war	  is	  extremely	  important	  evidence	  of	  opportunism.	  	  	   This	  contrast	  in	  opinions	  on	  the	  prospects	  of	  the	  war	  show	  us	  a	  correlational	  pattern	  that	  indicates	  those	  who	  show	  a	  belief	  that	  the	  war	  is	  going	  well	  also	  show	  stronger	  support	  of	  the	  Nazi	  regime.	  The	  opposite	  is	  also	  true,	  a	  belief	  that	  Germany	  will	  lose	  the	  war	  correlates	  with	  statements	  of	  anti-­‐Nazism.	  We	  cannot	  claim	  causation	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  one	  of	  which	  being	  that	  even	  if	  causation	  were	  to	  be	  proven,	  directionality	  of	  the	  causation	  would	  be	  complicated.	  However,	  this	  correlation	  is	  enough	  to	  make	  an	  argument	  about	  the	  clearly	  opportunist	  strategy	  that	  is	  taking	  place.	  If	  one	  believes	  that	  the	  war	  is	  being	  lost,	  there	  is	  a	  benefit	  to	  also	  stop	  claiming	  belief	  in	  the	  ideals	  of	  the	  Nazi	  party.	  There	  is	  an	  incentive	  to	  begin,	  whether	  consciously	  or	  unconsciously,	  creating	  a	  defense.	  However,	  if	  one	  believes	  the	  war	  is	  going	  well,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  unsubscribe	  to	  Nazism	  because	  there	  would	  be	  no	  repercussions	  to	  holding	  such	  beliefs.	  This	  is	  yet	  another	  support	  within	  the	  generals’	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  hypothesized	  topoi	  of	  opportunism	  common	  to	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric.	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Public	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   We	  do	  not	  see	  Eichmann	  make	  any	  real	  claims	  of	  opportunist	  motivations	  directly	  in	  his	  public	  interrogations;	  however,	  we	  do	  see	  an	  indirect	  appeal	  to	  opportunism.	  I	  think	  that	  this	  is	  very	  telling.	  During	  the	  war,	  Germany	  was	  able	  to	  claim	  motivations	  from	  a	  victim’s	  standpoint;	  but	  years	  after	  the	  war	  had	  ended,	  the	  atrocities	  uncovered,	  and	  Germany	  no	  longer	  the	  victim	  but	  the	  undeniable	  perpetrator	  of	  criminal	  policies,	  Eichmann	  is	  no	  longer	  able	  to	  rely	  on	  this	  common	  topos	  as	  a	  method	  of	  explaining	  away	  his	  and	  the	  Reich’s	  behavior.	  He	  cannot	  play	  the	  victim	  in	  this	  case.	  To	  do	  so	  would	  ruin	  his	  credibility	  and	  it	  would	  make	  him	  an	  even	  more	  unsympathetic	  character.	  To	  play	  the	  sore	  loser	  of	  World	  War	  I	  would	  do	  nothing	  to	  save	  his	  life	  under	  these	  circumstances	  in	  a	  situation	  run	  by	  people	  unsympathetic	  to	  Germany’s	  plight	  after	  WWI	  and	  who	  will	  determine	  his	  fate.	  They	  are	  prosecuting	  him	  for	  his	  actions	  in	  World	  War	  II,	  not	  whether	  he	  was	  in	  the	  right	  because	  his	  country	  was	  hurt	  by	  the	  handling	  of	  the	  repercussions	  of	  World	  War	  I.	  Again,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  Eichmann	  did	  not	  see	  this	  opportunist	  argument	  as	  a	  legitimate	  reason	  why	  he	  took	  the	  actions	  he	  did	  and	  thus	  excluded	  it	  from	  his	  testimony	  out	  of	  legitimate	  irrelevance	  to	  his	  own	  actions	  and	  a	  piece	  of	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  that	  never	  resonated	  with	  him.	  Eichmann	  had	  sufficient	  cause	  to	  not	  include	  this	  topos	  were	  it	  something	  that	  had	  resonated	  with	  him.	  	   The	  way	  we	  see	  Eichmann	  appeal	  to	  this	  hypothesized	  topoi	  of	  opportunism	  is	  through	  his	  claims	  of	  never	  being	  an	  anti	  semite.	  As	  we	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  regarding	  perception	  of	  an	  existential	  threat,	  Eichmann	  was	  extremely	  anti-­‐semitic,	  but	  in	  his	  interrogations,	  he	  claims	  otherwise.	  This	  retraction	  of	  previously	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held	  beliefs	  is	  clearly	  opportunistic	  for	  Eichmann.	  It	  is	  an	  example	  of	  him	  saying	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  the	  right	  people,and	  of	  this	  chameleon-­‐like	  strategy	  of	  projecting	  oneself	  as	  what	  the	  audience	  wants.	  From	  what	  we	  have	  looked	  at,	  it	  seems	  as	  though	  Eichmann	  only	  openly	  subscribes	  to	  Nazism	  as	  long	  as	  Nazism	  is	  winning	  and	  this	  is	  an	  important	  example	  of	  a	  correlational	  relationship	  between	  O’Shaughnessy’s	  hypothesized	  Hitler	  topoi	  and	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  his	  generals.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Overall,	  we	  see	  that	  this	  topos	  of	  political	  opportunism	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  public	  forum	  of	  generals	  captured	  and	  held	  at	  Trent	  Park	  in	  their	  recorded	  discussions,	  and	  we	  see	  evidence	  of	  its	  replication	  in	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  Adolf	  Eichmann	  indirectly	  in	  the	  public	  forum	  of	  his	  interrogations.	  This	  difference	  in	  how	  the	  hypothesized	  topoi	  appears	  in	  each	  setting	  tells	  us	  that	  there	  is	  probably	  some	  difference	  in	  the	  public	  and	  private	  forums	  and	  changes	  that	  occurred	  between	  the	  times	  they	  occurred	  that	  led	  to	  the	  specific	  inclusion	  or	  exclusion	  of	  this	  topos	  from	  one’s	  argument.	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Charisma	  	  	  
Private	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Among	  the	  generals	  captured	  and	  held	  at	  Trent	  Park,	  one	  of	  the	  common	  topos	  that	  came	  up	  time	  and	  time	  again	  in	  their	  discussions	  was	  that	  of	  Hitler’s	  charisma	  and	  his	  almost	  magical	  ability	  to	  persuade	  those	  in	  his	  presence.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Heim,	  one	  of	  the	  generals	  held	  at	  Trent	  Park	  noted	  in	  private	  conversation,	  “It	  isn’t	  true	  that	  all	  our	  leaders	  are	  spineless…Who	  creep	  and	  crawl	  to	  him	  the	  moment	  they	  come	  before	  him,	  as	  one	  likes	  to	  picture	  it,	  but	  on	  the	  contrary	  he	  has	  a	  
remarkable	  hypnotic	  power"	  (Neitzel	  135).	  This	  hypnotic	  power	  did	  not	  just	  affect	  those	  who	  viewed	  Hitler	  from	  a	  distance,	  who	  were	  never	  directly	  in	  contact	  with	  the	  man.	  It	  was	  not	  an	  effect	  of	  media	  power	  and	  careful,	  practiced	  execution,	  but	  rather	  an	  enthralling	  power	  of	  the	  man	  himself.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Another	  high-­‐ranking	  German	  prisoner	  of	  war,	  Crüwell,	  was	  also	  very	  aware	  of	  this	  power.	  The	  POW	  is	  recorded	  as	  saying,	  "I	  am	  convinced	  that	  a	  great	  part	  of	  the	  Führer's	  success	  as	  Party	  Leader	  is	  accounted	  for	  by	  pure	  mass	  suggestion.	  It's	  bound	  up	  with	  a	  kind	  of	  hypnotism,	  and	  he	  can	  exercise	  this	  on	  a	  great	  many	  people.	  I	  know	  people	  who	  are	  undoubtedly	  superior	  to	  him	  mentally	  and	  who	  yet	  fall	  under	  this	  spell”	  (Neitzel	  67).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   This	  charismatic	  persona	  was	  also	  elevated	  a	  step	  further	  and	  created	  this	  magical	  persona	  of	  Hitler	  that	  was	  idolized	  in	  an	  almost	  religious	  matter.	  This	  was	  more	  the	  case	  for	  those	  who	  were	  not	  close	  to	  the	  man,	  those	  who	  did	  not	  have	  access	  to	  him	  regularly.	  One	  general	  noted	  the	  religiosity	  of	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Reich	  and	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discussed	  the	  effect	  of	  such	  a	  transcendent	  depiction	  of	  the	  leader	  as	  follows:	  “German	  propaganda	  made	  Hitler	  into	  a	  sort	  of	  God,	  and	  now	  the	  people	  expect	  a	  miracle”	  (Neitzel	  	  131).	  	  There	  was	  a	  feeling	  that	  he	  was	  somehow	  more	  than	  human	  that	  pervaded	  so	  many	  depictions	  and	  descriptions	  of	  Adolf	  Hitler.	  This	  ties	  back	  to	  the	  charisma	  and	  mysticism	  that	  those	  who	  experienced	  it	  claimed	  resulted	  in	  a	  certain	  blind	  obedience.	  When	  discussing	  the	  July	  20th	  plot	  to	  assassinate	  Hitler,	  Sponeck15,	  a	  general	  held	  at	  Trent	  Park,	  who	  was	  discussing	  how	  those	  who	  committed	  the	  attempt	  were	  being	  punished,	  and	  in	  response	  to	  another	  general	  noting	  that	  the	  method	  of	  execution	  of	  the	  would-­‐be	  assassins	  seemed	  unfair	  and	  that	  their	  executions	  should	  be	  more	  honorable	  stated,	  “Yes,	  but	  he	  (Hitler)	  is	  a	  ‘God’.	  It	  is	  a	  crime	  against	  ‘God’”(Neitzel	  250).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   This	  belief	  that	  Hitler	  himself	  was	  somehow	  more	  than	  human,	  whether	  that	  be	  through	  his	  extraordinary	  charisma	  and	  powers	  of	  persuasion	  or,	  when	  taken	  to	  the	  extreme,	  his	  godliness,	  is	  a	  clear	  example	  of	  the	  same	  topos	  common	  to	  Hitler’s	  own	  rhetoric.	  However,	  it	  was	  not	  a	  belief	  held	  by	  all	  of	  the	  generals	  at	  Trent	  Park.	  Bruhn	  states	  in	  April	  of	  1945,	  “one	  is	  only	  sonstantly	  astounded	  that	  we	  all	  ran	  after	  this	  will	  o’	  the	  wisp	  as	  we	  did”	  (Neitzel	  147).	  This	  sentiment	  of	  anti-­‐Hitlerism	  was	  strong	  amongst	  many	  of	  the	  generals.	  Heim	  attributes	  problems	  of	  the	  war	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  “it	  is	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  madman,	  a	  criminal”	  (Neitzel	  144).	  Thoma	  described	  Hitler	  by	  saying	  	  “mentally,	  he	  is	  ill,	  very	  ill”	  (Neitzel	  94).	  One	  general	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  say	  the	  following:	  "I	  went	  there	  and	  Hitler	  made	  me	  a	  speech	  for	  three-­‐quarters	  of	  
                                                
15 Generalleutnant Theodor Graf von Sponeck entered the army in August of 
1914 and was held at Trent Park from June to September of 1944. He was 
described by the CSDIC (UK) as “neurotic and very moody” and “defeatist, anti-
Nazi, and a monarchist” during his time at Trent Park (Neitzel 315). 
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an	  hour,	  as	  though	  I	  were	  a	  public	  meeting.	  He	  gets	  drunk	  with	  his	  own	  speeches!	  I	  went	  into	  the	  room	  and	  there	  he	  stood,	  a	  fat,	  broken-­‐down	  old	  man	  with	  festering	  hands."	  (Neitzel	  94)	  Hitler	  portrayed	  himself	  as	  this	  extra-­‐human	  leader,	  but	  one’s	  view	  of	  this	  seems	  to	  be	  dependent	  on	  some	  other	  factor.	  The	  establishment	  of	  Hitler’s	  charisma	  was	  a	  two	  way	  street	  that	  required	  a	  certain	  predisposition	  to	  belief.	  It	  seems	  that	  there	  is	  rhetorical	  evidence	  in	  the	  private	  sphere	  to	  suggest	  some	  support	  for	  the	  hypothesized	  topoi	  of	  charisma	  in	  Hitler’s	  generals’	  private	  deliberations,	  but	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  less	  universal	  than	  expected	  decreases	  the	  strength	  of	  this	  hypothesized	  topoi.	  	  	  
Public	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   This	  claim	  of	  charisma	  and	  hypnotic	  abilities	  of	  Hitler,	  however,	  is	  not	  something	  we	  see	  in	  the	  Eichmann	  interrogations.	  Eichmann	  never	  describes	  Hitler	  in	  this	  way	  nor	  does	  he	  attempt	  to	  excuse	  his	  own	  crimes	  by	  claiming	  this	  influence.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  Eichmann	  did	  not	  have	  these	  sort	  of	  hypnotic	  interactions	  with	  Hitler.	  However,	  I	  also	  believe	  there	  are	  a	  few	  reasons	  he	  might	  have	  omitted	  discussing	  this	  hypnotic	  power	  of	  Hitler	  in	  a	  public	  trial	  scenario.	  	  First,	  in	  a	  public	  setting,	  suggesting	  an	  almost	  mystical	  or	  magical	  capability	  of	  a	  leader	  who	  has	  been	  so	  strongly	  vilified	  for	  causing	  horrible	  atrocities	  is	  not	  going	  to	  help	  his	  case.	  Secondly,	  claiming	  that	  someone	  was	  particularly	  convincing	  that	  an	  entire	  race	  of	  people	  is	  evil	  is	  also	  not	  beneficial	  to	  his	  case	  as	  it	  proves	  that	  this	  is	  something	  he	  once	  believed.	  Eichmann’s	  strategy,	  throughout	  the	  interrogation	  is	  to	  deny	  everything.	  Then,	  if	  that	  does	  not	  work	  he	  claims	  it	  didn’t	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happen	  exactly	  in	  the	  way	  described.	  And	  when	  these	  two	  attempts	  fail,	  he	  falls	  back	  on	  the	  explanation	  that	  he	  was	  only	  following	  orders.	  There	  is	  powerlessness	  here,	  but	  a	  powerlessness	  that	  is	  caused	  by	  a	  theoretically	  moral	  act:	  duty	  and	  loyalty.	  There	  is	  no	  morality	  to	  simply	  being	  legitimately	  convinced	  by	  a	  persuasive	  person	  to	  kill	  millions	  of	  people,	  no	  matter	  how	  mystical	  their	  powers	  of	  persuasion	  may	  have	  been,	  and	  that	  which	  did	  not	  invoke	  sympathy	  in	  the	  audience	  would	  not	  aid	  Eichmann.	  Eichmann	  claims,	  throughout,	  that	  he	  was	  not	  an	  anti-­‐Semite	  and	  to	  claim	  that	  he	  had	  been	  affected	  by	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  to	  believe	  differently	  despite	  his	  initial	  feelings	  would	  contradict	  this	  statement	  (Von	  Lang	  57).	  Whether	  he	  was	  aware	  of	  Hitler’s	  charisma	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  he	  felt	  he	  had	  been	  affected	  by	  this	  sort	  of	  mystical	  power	  of	  persuasion,	  Eichmann	  could	  not	  and	  would	  not	  admit	  to	  it	  because	  to	  do	  so	  could	  potentially	  put	  his	  life	  at	  stake.	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  Propaganda	  Of	  The	  Deed	  	  	  
Private	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   In	  the	  captured	  generals	  from	  Trent	  Park,	  we	  see	  a	  good	  amount	  of	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  was	  potentially	  some	  successful	  rhetorical	  replication	  of	  this	  topos	  which	  is	  suggestive	  of	  Hitler’s	  rhetorical	  impact.	  There	  is	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  initial	  good	  of	  Hitler’s	  regime	  that	  these	  generals	  seem	  to	  recognize	  as	  the	  reason	  why	  rebellion	  didn’t	  take	  place	  when	  it	  could	  have	  made	  a	  difference	  or	  been	  successful.	  There	  is	  a	  sense	  of	  willful	  blindness	  due	  to	  the	  initial	  improvements	  that	  occurred	  for	  the	  general	  welfare	  of	  Germany	  after	  Hitler	  took	  over.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   These	  generals	  discussed	  retrospectively	  and	  on	  multiple	  occasions,	  their	  slow	  build	  to	  supposed	  disagreement	  with	  the	  ideals	  of	  the	  Reich.	  In	  this	  private	  setting,	  German	  Admiral	  Hennecke16	  made	  the	  statement	  in	  regards	  to	  higher-­‐ranking	  members	  of	  the	  Reich:	  “They…found	  themselves	  more	  and	  more	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  Party,	  but	  they	  never	  opened	  their	  mouths	  when	  it	  was	  necessary…that	  was	  the	  great	  mistake."	  (Neitzel	  90).	  Here	  we	  see	  him	  claim	  a	  growing	  disagreement	  with	  the	  practices	  of	  the	  Reich	  and	  a	  complaint	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  early	  rebellion.	  Hennecke	  seems	  to	  see	  this	  as	  what	  would	  have	  been	  the	  solution.	  We	  see	  here	  recognition	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  Reich’s	  practice	  of	  reeling	  in	  supporters	  through	  initial	  improvements	  and	  a	  slow	  build	  up	  to	  more	  radical	  policies	  that	  left	  rebellion	  off	  the	  table.	  Once	  one	  has	  agreed	  to	  so	  much,	  it	  is	  much	  harder	  to	  find	  
                                                
16 Konteradmiral Walter Hennecke entered the Imperial Navy in October of 1915 
during WWI. He was held at Trent Park from July of 1944 until September of 
1944. The CSDIC (UK) described him during this time as “being by no means 
100 percent Nazi…[but] not pro-British and out for himself” (Neitzel 297). 
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obvious	  and	  clear	  fault	  in	  the	  next	  step	  further.	  This	  propaganda	  of	  the	  initial	  deeds,	  Hennecke	  is	  arguing,	  prevented	  these	  high-­‐ranking	  officials	  from	  being	  able	  to	  fully	  recognize	  and	  act	  on	  their	  oppositional	  attitudes.	  Hennecke	  states,	  "It	  [rebellion]	  should	  have	  been	  done	  in	  1933	  or	  in	  1934	  when	  things	  started"	  (Neitzel	  90).	  This	  is	  right	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  Hitler’s	  rule	  and	  the	  period	  in	  which	  so	  much	  of	  this	  propaganda	  of	  the	  initial	  deeds	  was	  taking	  place,	  and	  Hennecke	  believes	  that	  rebellion	  needed	  to	  be	  recognized	  as	  necessary	  at	  this	  time	  point	  to	  have	  been	  effective.	  We	  see	  these	  generals’	  claim	  a	  powerlessness	  to	  rebel	  in	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  Reich	  that	  they	  attribute	  to	  an	  overpowering	  agreement	  and	  contentment	  with	  the	  improvements	  that	  Hitler	  was	  making,	  and	  this	  is	  exemplified	  in	  a	  quote	  from	  one	  of	  the	  captured	  generals,	  Köhn17.	  	  Köhn	  states	  “I	  regarded	  National	  Socialism	  idealistically	  and	  in	  my	  opinion	  it	  offered	  the	  only	  possibility	  for	  the	  German	  people	  at	  the	  time;	  I	  also	  saw	  its	  successes.	  In	  my	  opinion	  nobody	  will	  deny	  the	  successes	  it	  achieved."	  (Neitzel	  90).	  When	  he	  is	  talking	  about	  successes	  we	  see	  even	  further	  evidence	  of	  the	  exactness	  of	  this	  propaganda	  of	  the	  deed.	  Köhn	  clarifies,	  “[National	  Socialism]	  got	  rid	  of	  the	  unemployed	  for	  us…history	  would	  have	  to	  grant	  it	  this	  one	  achievement,	  that	  it	  solved	  the	  problem	  of	  unemployment”	  (Neitzel	  90).	  Even	  now,	  in	  this	  conversation	  Köhn	  is	  having	  in	  which	  he	  is	  so	  strongly	  convicted	  about	  the	  wrongness	  of	  the	  Reich	  that	  he	  is	  discussing	  the	  necessity	  of	  rebellion,	  he	  is	  unable	  
                                                
17 Oberst Walter Köhn entered the army in March of 1913, was discharged in 
1920, went on to join the Prussian Landespolizei, and re-entered the army in 
October of 1935. He was at Trent Park from July to August of 1944. The CSDIC 
(UK) described him as “a Nazi at heart and one of those who had believed in 
Hitler.” They also believe he took Germany’s defeats and the July 20th attack on 
Hitler very hard, and saw him as very critical of high-ranking Party officials who 
he seemed to believe were only keeping the war going in order to to keep 
themselves alive (Neitzel 302-303). 
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to	  deny	  what	  he	  sees	  as	  the	  good	  Hitler	  did	  at	  the	  beginning.	  Another	  captured	  general,	  in	  reminiscing	  on	  what	  Hitler	  once	  was	  and	  what	  was	  to	  come	  for	  Germany	  now	  that	  Hitler	  had	  died	  just	  a	  few	  days	  previous	  states,	  “It’s	  just	  another	  dictatorship	  now…[Hitler]	  impressed	  us.	  Actually	  he	  once	  had	  very	  good	  ideas."	  (Neitzel	  158)	  In	  all	  of	  these	  general’s	  comments,	  there	  is	  an	  overwhelming	  sense	  of	  a	  downward	  trajectory	  of	  the	  Reich’s	  ideals	  that	  could	  only	  be	  carried	  out	  because	  the	  initial	  good	  that	  was	  done	  created	  a	  sense	  of	  security	  and	  was	  seen	  as	  evidence	  of	  its	  ability	  to	  implement	  policies	  that	  would	  better	  the	  country.	  This	  rationalization	  for	  the	  later	  policies	  that	  resulted	  in	  countless	  atrocities	  is	  an	  excellent	  example	  of	  the	  potential	  effect	  of	  Hitler’s	  rhetorical	  use	  of	  propaganda	  of	  the	  deed	  on	  his	  generals.	  
Public	  	   This	  is	  not	  a	  topos	  of	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  that	  is	  only	  seen	  replicated	  in	  the	  private	  forum,	  there	  also	  seems	  to	  be	  evidence	  of	  its	  persuasive	  effects	  in	  the	  public	  forum	  setting	  of	  the	  interrogation	  of	  Adolf	  Eichmann.	  Eichmann	  utilizes	  this	  topos	  in	  a	  much	  more	  direct	  way.	  For	  Eichmann,	  because	  he	  was	  so	  high	  ranking,	  Hitler’s	  and	  the	  Reich’s	  goals,	  were	  his	  goals,	  so	  we	  see	  Eichmann	  utilize	  these	  initial	  deeds	  of	  improvement	  as	  evidence	  of	  his	  own	  initial	  mission	  for	  good	  in	  his	  role	  in	  the	  Reich.	  Eichmann	  states	  that	  it	  was	  these	  initial	  deeds	  that	  attracted	  him	  to	  Hitler	  and	  the	  government.	  “In	  those	  first	  years,	  what	  mattered	  to	  me,	  as	  I’ve	  already	  said,	  was	  work	  and	  bread	  for	  seven	  million	  people,	  an	  Autobahn,	  and	  the	  fight	  against	  Versailles	  –in	  those	  matters	  my	  attitude	  was	  unconditional”	  (Von	  Lang	  40).	  These	  were	  the	  things	  he	  claims	  he	  believed	  were	  Hitler’s	  goals	  in	  full.	  He	  talks	  about	  how	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this	  is	  the	  doctrine	  that	  he	  believed	  in	  and	  that	  he	  signed	  up	  to	  support.	  He	  claims	  that	  he	  was	  hopeful	  for	  change	  under	  this	  doctrine	  and	  leadership	  (Von	  Lang	  36).	  Eichmann,	  on	  multiple	  occasions	  aims	  to	  convince	  his	  interrogator	  that	  “in	  the	  early	  period,	  the	  Jewish	  problem	  wasn’t	  the	  main	  thing.	  What	  interested	  us	  in	  Austria	  was	  work	  and	  bread,	  freedom,	  an	  end	  to	  servitude”	  (Von	  Lang	  41).	  	  There	  is	  a	  repetition	  of	  this	  simplified	  goal	  of	  providing	  basic	  necessities.	  Later	  in	  the	  same	  conversation	  Eichmann	  again	  states	  his	  goals	  for	  those	  first	  few	  years:	  “work	  and	  bread	  for	  seven	  million	  people,	  an	  Autobahn,	  and	  the	  fight	  against	  Versailles”	  (Von	  Lang	  40).	  There	  is	  a	  sense	  of	  a	  singular,	  almost	  blinding	  focus	  that	  he	  attempts	  to	  utilize	  in	  order	  to	  deny	  his	  involvement	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  policies	  that	  would	  inevitably	  lead	  to	  the	  Holocaust.	  He	  states	  in	  his	  interrogation	  with	  Less,	  “I	  saw	  a	  nationalism	  that	  appealed	  to	  me.	  Hitler	  fulminated	  against	  Versailles,	  work	  and	  bread	  were	  promised,	  and	  the	  promise	  was	  kept	  later	  on…But	  this	  would	  take	  us	  too	  far”	  (Von	  Lang	  36).	  Eichmann	  frames	  this	  initial	  propaganda	  of	  the	  deed	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  manipulation	  of	  his	  true	  hopes	  and	  goals	  for	  the	  country	  that	  inspired	  his	  dedication	  to	  the	  Reich	  and	  that	  was	  later	  exploited	  to	  create	  and	  implement	  more	  radical	  policies	  that	  he	  did	  not	  believe	  in.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   This	  claim	  of	  the	  intensity	  of	  propaganda	  of	  the	  deed	  is	  suggestive	  of	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  Reich’s	  propaganda	  if	  true.	  But	  it	  also	  tells	  us	  a	  lot	  even	  if	  Eichmann	  is	  utilizing	  this	  topos	  for	  his	  own	  benefit.	  This	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  propaganda	  of	  the	  initial	  deeds	  of	  the	  Reich	  was	  so	  widely	  utilized	  and	  known	  that	  Eichmann	  feels	  it	  was	  so	  entrenched	  in	  the	  German	  society	  that	  there	  is	  a	  chance	  he	  can	  believably	  utilize	  it	  to	  save	  his	  life.	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COMMON	  NON-­‐HITLER	  TOPOI	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  There	  are	  a	  few	  topoi	  found	  in	  both	  the	  public	  and	  private	  deliberations	  of	  Eichmann	  and	  the	  generals	  at	  Trent	  Park	  that	  are	  not	  aspects	  of	  Hitler	  or	  the	  Reich’s	  rhetoric	  in	  any	  way	  but	  that	  are	  important	  to	  our	  overall	  understanding	  of	  the	  rhetorical	  power	  and	  reach	  of	  Hitler’s	  propaganda.	  These	  topoi	  include	  a	  fear	  of	  internal	  punishment,	  a	  denial	  of	  knowledge,	  and	  a	  belief	  that	  Germany	  should	  have	  taken	  action	  against	  the	  ‘Jewish	  problem’	  but	  should	  have	  done	  so	  differently.	  	  
Fear	  of	  Internal	  Punishment	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   This	  first	  topos	  of	  a	  fear	  of	  internal	  punishment	  is	  largely	  found	  as	  an	  explanation	  for	  crimes	  committed.	  The	  idea	  that	  Nazi	  Germany	  was	  cruel	  is	  an	  established	  one,	  so	  why	  wouldn’t	  this	  be	  the	  case	  for	  its	  generals	  as	  well	  as	  those	  being	  persecuted.	  This	  thought	  process	  allows	  the	  explanation	  of	  “fear	  of	  punishment”	  to	  come	  off	  as	  sincere.	  In	  reality,	  many	  of	  these	  generals	  argue	  that	  they	  were	  never	  truly	  under	  any	  threat	  for	  non-­‐compliance.	  Nonetheless	  the	  topos	  was	  utilized.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   In	  the	  private	  forum	  of	  the	  captured	  generals	  living	  at	  Trent	  Park	  we	  see	  this	  appeal	  often.	  Phuhlstein18,	  one	  of	  these	  generals,	  when	  asked	  why	  Germany	  was	  still	  fighting	  in	  April	  of	  1945	  stated,	  "Orders	  now	  are	  always	  worded	  as	  follows:	  'I	  order	  
                                                
18 Generalmajor Alexander von Pfuhlstein entered the Prussian army during WWI 
in March of 1917. In September of 1944, he was arrested by the Gestapo and 
released in January of 1945 under the condition that he proved himself on the 
war front. Neitzel explains, “Pfuhlstein had close contacts to the military 
conspiracy.” He was held in Trent Park from April until August of 1945. 
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this	  and	  that.	  If	  it	  should	  not	  succeed,	  you	  will	  be	  shot'"	  (Neitzel	  148).	  This	  topos	  takes	  Hitler’s	  topos	  of	  following	  orders	  to	  a	  higher	  level.	  Not	  only	  do	  these	  generals	  rationalize	  their	  actions	  through	  following	  orders,	  but	  they	  disavow	  themselves	  from	  any	  obligation	  to	  revolt	  by	  noting	  the	  harshness	  of	  punishment	  they	  would	  receive	  were	  they	  to	  do	  so.	  In	  a	  discussion	  between	  a	  father	  and	  a	  son	  at	  Trent	  Park,	  we	  see	  the	  father	  explain	  to	  his	  son	  why	  a	  general	  who	  thought	  Hitler	  was	  mad	  would	  follow	  him.	  He	  explained,	  "it	  was	  like	  this:	  you	  could	  say	  that	  all	  the	  Generals	  were	  given	  the	  choice	  of	  either...or	  you	  are	  all	  involved;	  your	  wives	  and	  children	  will	  be	  shot	  and	  you	  yourselves	  will	  be	  hanged."	  (Neitzel	  265)	  But	  this	  was	  blatantly	  untrue.	  According	  to	  Christopher	  Browning,	  a	  professor	  of	  history	  and	  contributor	  to	  Yad	  Vashem’s	  official	  history	  of	  the	  Holocaust,	  “in	  the	  the	  past	  forty-­‐five	  years	  no	  defense	  attorney	  or	  defendant	  in	  any	  of	  the	  hundreds	  of	  postwar	  trials	  has	  been	  able	  to	  document	  a	  single	  case	  in	  which	  the	  refusal	  to	  obey	  an	  order	  to	  kill	  unarmed	  civilians	  resulted	  in	  the	  allegedly	  inevitable	  dire	  punishment”	  (170).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   It	  is	  interesting	  that	  we	  see	  this	  sort	  of	  appeal	  to	  fear	  of	  punishment	  in	  the	  private	  sphere	  before	  the	  war	  ended.	  This	  suggests	  that	  there	  was	  not	  only	  a	  practical	  reason	  to	  utilize	  this	  topos,	  but	  rather	  that	  some	  of	  these	  generals	  might	  have	  truly	  believed	  in	  that	  they	  could	  be	  punished	  physically	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  sort	  of	  punishment	  is	  not	  historically	  accurate.	  To	  give	  such	  a	  reason	  for	  your	  actions	  in	  a	  private	  setting	  doesn’t	  do	  much	  to	  exonerate	  you	  from	  anyone	  other	  than	  your	  peers.	  This	  however	  also	  cannot	  be	  overlooked.	  No	  one	  wants	  to	  look	  like	  the	  monster.	  Even	  amongst	  their	  peers.	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   Eichmann	  also	  utilized	  this	  topos,	  and	  he	  had	  reason	  to	  do	  so.	  This	  was	  a	  useful	  means	  of	  claiming	  his	  own	  innocence	  of	  crimes.	  He	  stated	  in	  response	  to	  questions	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  he	  was	  opposed	  to	  the	  killing	  of	  Jews,	  “If	  I	  hadn’t	  obeyed	  then,	  I’d	  have	  been	  punished	  then”	  (Von	  Lang	  198).	  Here	  we	  see	  Eichmann	  again	  utilize	  this	  topos	  of	  a	  fear	  of	  punishment	  to	  explain	  away	  his	  actions.	  He	  again	  does	  this	  when	  he	  stated,	  “There	  was	  one	  way	  and	  only	  one	  way	  [to	  circumvent	  Hitler’s	  order]:	  to	  take	  a	  pistol	  and	  shoot	  yourself”	  (Von	  Lang	  197).	  	  Eichmann	  here	  utilizes	  a	  fear	  of	  punishment	  to	  paint	  himself	  as	  a	  helpless	  victim	  of	  the	  orders	  of	  the	  Reich.	  
Denial	  of	  Knowledge	  The	  second	  topos	  that	  comes	  up	  a	  lot	  in	  the	  private	  and	  public	  deliberations	  of	  Hitler’s	  generals	  is	  a	  denial	  of	  knowledge.	  In	  the	  captured	  generals,	  we	  see	  disagreement	  between	  what	  was	  known	  and	  not	  known.	  We	  see	  Hennecke	  talk	  about	  the	  internal	  confusion	  as	  to	  what	  was	  going	  on	  and	  his	  own	  reasons	  for	  initial	  skepticism,	  "I	  never	  heard	  much	  about	  those	  things	  before	  I	  came	  here.	  At	  first	  I	  wouldn't	  believe	  them.	  There	  is	  such	  a	  lot	  of	  silly	  talk!	  Whenever	  you	  ask:	  'Did	  you	  see	  it	  yourself?'	  or	  'Do	  you	  really	  know	  someone?',	  you	  got	  the	  answer:	  'No,	  an	  uncle	  of	  Mrs	  so-­‐and-­‐so	  told	  me’"	  (Neitzel	  99).	  According	  to	  Hennecke,	  this	  was	  information	  that	  was	  informally	  rather	  than	  officially	  spread	  which	  allowed	  for	  a	  level	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  potentially	  differing	  levels	  of	  knowledge	  between	  German	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generals.	  When	  Schlieben19	  talks	  about	  just	  how	  much	  was	  known	  about	  the	  realities	  of	  concentration	  camps,	  we	  see	  a	  repetition	  of	  this	  seemingly	  less	  official	  transmission	  of	  information,	  but	  a	  different	  conclusion.	  Schlieben	  claimed,	  "Everybody	  knew	  that	  dreadful	  things	  happened	  in	  them	  -­‐-­‐	  not	  exactly	  what,	  but	  just	  that	  dreadful	  things	  happened	  in	  them	  -­‐-­‐	  every	  one	  of	  us	  knew	  that	  as	  far	  back	  as	  '35"	  (Neitzel	  232).	  This	  is	  simply	  the	  same	  argument	  that	  Hennecke	  made,	  but	  instead	  of	  taking	  the	  information	  provided	  and	  assuming	  it	  must	  be	  false,	  Schlieben	  made	  the	  assumption	  it	  was	  true.	  It	  seems	  clear	  that	  it	  was	  not	  the	  information	  being	  spread	  that	  differed,	  but	  rather	  how	  one	  chose	  to	  interpret	  that	  information.	  	  We	  see	  another	  general	  discuss	  war	  crimes	  that	  occurred	  in	  Russia	  in	  a	  more	  personal	  way	  and	  make	  a	  denial	  that	  again	  removes	  him	  from	  blame.	  Kittel20	  denies	  his	  own	  involvement	  in	  the	  massacre	  of	  Jews	  at	  Rostov	  when	  he	  says	  "18,000	  Jews	  were	  killed	  at	  Rostov.	  Of	  course	  I	  had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  whole	  affair!	  But	  it	  is	  down	  on	  my	  account	  because	  I	  was	  the	  only	  known	  'General'	  there"	  (Neitzel	  214).	  This	  denial	  of	  involvement	  but	  acceptance	  of	  punishment	  is	  interesting.	  There	  was	  a	  mix	  of	  admission	  of	  knowledge	  in	  these	  generals.	  Some	  claimed	  that	  they	  knew	  
                                                
19 Generalleutnant Kurt Wilhelm von Schlieben entered the army in August of 
1914 and held at Trent Park from July  of 1944 to August of 1945. According to 
CSDIC (UK), during this time, Schlieben “[had] more bluff than guts,” was “much 
inclined to self-pity,” and “revealed colossal ignorance” (Neitzel 312-313). 
20 Generalleutnant Heinrich Kittel entered the army in July of 1911 and was 
brought as prisoner to Trent Park in January of 1945. In his final assessment by 
the army, he was described as a “convinced National Socialist,” and according to 
CSDIC (UK), Kittel was “connected with most major political happenings in 
Germany” throughout his career. He is also described during his time at Trent 
Park as being “strongly opposed to the Nazi ‘State within the State’,” “detest[ing] 
the Police, SS, SD and administration camarilla” but seeing it as his duty to 
Germany to “not do or say anything which might damage the war effort of the 
Reich” (Neitzel 301-302). 
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nothing	  of	  what	  occurred	  in	  concentration	  camps	  or	  of	  the	  war	  crimes	  committed	  throughout	  Europe	  by	  the	  Germans,	  but	  others	  claimed	  that	  this	  ignorance	  could	  not	  be	  true.	  According	  to	  these	  generals,	  everyone	  was	  aware	  that	  something	  was	  going	  on.	  It	  is	  the	  denial	  of	  legally	  actionable	  knowledge	  of	  crimes	  that	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  common	  thread.	  	   Eichmann	  however,	  was	  even	  more	  prolific	  in	  his	  denial	  of	  knowledge	  of	  the	  war	  crimes	  he	  was	  blamed	  for.	  When	  confronted	  with	  the	  mass	  murders	  of	  Jews	  that	  took	  place	  in	  Riga	  and	  in	  Minsk	  in	  the	  autumn	  of	  1941	  and	  evidence	  of	  his	  involvement	  in	  the	  transportation	  of	  Jews	  to	  these	  places	  and	  his	  involvement	  with	  the	  action	  groups	  who	  carried	  out	  the	  crimes,	  Eichmann	  made	  the	  claim,	  “I	  didn’t	  know	  about	  it	  at	  the	  time,	  but	  of	  course	  I	  heard	  about	  it	  later.”	  (Von	  Lang	  81).	  This	  is	  not	  the	  only	  instance	  of	  him	  claiming	  ignorance	  of	  a	  war	  crime.	  When	  confronted	  with	  a	  statement	  from	  the	  former	  head	  of	  the	  “technical	  disinfection	  service”	  of	  the	  SS	  that	  claimed	  that	  prussic	  acid,	  a	  poison,	  had	  been	  ordered	  by	  Günther,	  Eichmann’s	  permanent	  representative,	  and	  who	  had	  asked	  whether	  the	  former	  head	  had	  a	  poison	  for	  killing	  people	  in	  Theresienstadt	  ghetto,	  Eichmann	  claimed	  to	  know	  nothing	  about	  it.	  He	  stated,	  “He	  didn’t	  get	  the	  order	  from	  me.	  I	  know	  nothing	  about	  it.”	  (Von	  Lang	  87).	  Eichmann	  also	  claimed	  that	  he	  did	  not	  know	  the	  fate	  of	  17,000	  Slovakian	  Jews	  in	  Poland	  who	  had	  been	  murdered	  (Von	  Lang	  161).	  These	  are	  just	  a	  few	  instances	  of	  the	  denial	  of	  knowledge	  of	  these	  crimes	  that	  occur	  throughout	  the	  interrogation.	  Eichmann	  claims	  to	  have	  known	  so	  little	  about	  anything	  that	  occurred	  that	  it	  is	  almost	  entirely	  unbelievable	  in	  the	  face	  of	  all	  the	  evidence	  provided	  to	  the	  contrary.	  However,	  this	  was	  a	  one	  of	  Eichmann’s	  only	  defense	  strategies.	  He	  denied	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knowledge	  about	  everything	  he	  believably	  could	  and	  even	  some	  he	  couldn’t.	  His	  perceived	  innocence	  would	  be	  the	  thing	  that	  determined	  whether	  or	  not	  he	  would	  live	  or	  die,	  and	  to	  deny	  knowledge	  of	  the	  crimes	  he	  was	  being	  tried	  for	  was	  the	  ultimate,	  last	  hope	  defense.	  
“Should	  Have	  Been	  Done	  Differently”	  	   The	  final	  common	  topos	  between	  Eichmann	  and	  the	  captured	  generals	  that	  is	  worth	  noting	  is	  that	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  these	  events	  did	  occur,	  but	  that	  they	  believe	  it	  should	  have	  been	  done	  differently.	  This	  is	  interesting	  because	  it	  reveals	  a	  lot	  about	  the	  deeply	  ingrained	  ideologies	  of	  these	  generals.	  In	  Tapping	  Hitler’s	  Generals	  we	  see	  this	  topos	  throughout	  multiple	  discussions.	  One	  former	  general	  named	  Jösting21	  said,	  "I	  quite	  agree	  that	  the	  Jews	  had	  to	  be	  turned	  out,	  that	  was	  obvious,	  but	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  it	  was	  done	  was	  absolutely	  wrong,	  and	  the	  present	  hatred	  is	  the	  result"	  (Neitzel	  229).	  This	  perception	  of	  a	  need	  to	  do	  something	  about	  Jewish	  people,	  but	  retrospectively	  disagreeing	  with	  the	  way	  it	  was	  handled	  is	  extremely	  prevalent	  in	  these	  private	  conversations	  and	  also	  extremely	  jarring	  at	  times.	  	  Quotes	  such	  as	  this	  one	  from	  a	  former	  general	  named	  Hellwig	  that	  begin	  with	  a	  statement	  rebuking	  the	  Nazis’	  actions	  but	  then	  evolve	  into	  a	  statement	  that	  does	  not	  reject	  the	  original	  ideology	  of	  the	  Nazi	  party,	  just	  renounces	  its	  methodology	  were	  common:	  “The	  manner	  in	  which	  we	  treated	  the	  Jews	  was	  wrong....They	  should	  have	  been	  able	  
21 Oberst Erwin Jösting entered the army in 1911, was discharged in 1920, and 
rejoined through the Luftwaffe in 1934. He was brought to Trent Park as a 
prisoner in April of 1945. The CSDIC (UK) describes him during this time at Trent 
Park as being a “Nazi of the Prussian type” and being “outspokenly anti-Semitic” 
(Neitzel 300). 
   
63 
to	  leave	  the	  country	  with	  all	  their	  money"	  (Neitzel	  188).	  This	  methodological	  disagreement	  was	  common	  amongst	  many	  of	  the	  captured	  generals,	  though	  what	  piece	  of	  the	  method	  was	  varied.	  The	  elder	  Eberbach22	  found	  fault	  with	  the	  specific	  demographic	  of	  the	  Jews	  that	  were	  killed:	  "In	  my	  opinion,	  one	  can	  go	  so	  far	  as	  to	  say	  that	  the	  killing	  of	  those	  million	  Jews	  or	  however	  many	  it	  was,	  was	  necessary	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  our	  people.	  But	  to	  kill	  the	  women	  and	  children	  wasn't	  necessary.	  That	  is	  going	  to	  far"	  (Neitzel	  103).	  Others,	  like	  Hellwig	  and	  Klenk	  thought	  the	  killing	  unnecessary:	  "Send	  them	  out	  of	  the	  country;	  get	  rid	  of	  them	  in	  a	  decent	  way,	  but	  not..."	  (Neitzel	  188).	  Others	  found	  fault	  not	  with	  the	  murder	  itself,	  but	  with	  how	  public	  that	  murder	  was.	  Another	  former	  general	  is	  quoting	  as	  having	  said,	  "The	  business	  with	  the	  Jews	  in	  Germany	  was	  quite	  right,	  only	  it	  should	  have	  been	  done	  quietly"	  (Neitzel	  107).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   This	  topos	  presents	  itself	  a	  little	  differently	  in	  Eichmann’s	  interrogations.	  Eichmann	  portrays	  his	  disillusion	  with	  the	  way	  Jews	  were	  treated	  without	  claiming	  that	  they	  should	  have	  been	  left	  alone	  through	  descriptions	  of	  his	  disgust	  with	  what	  he	  witnessed.	  Eichmann	  said	  things	  such	  as	  “I	  was	  horrified.	  My	  nerves	  aren’t	  strong	  enough…	  I	  can’t	  listen	  to	  such	  things…	  such	  things,	  without	  their	  affecting	  me”	  in	  
                                                
22 General der Panzertruppe Heinrich Eberbach (Father) entered the army in July 
of 1914. He was severely wounded in WWI, subsequently joined the police in 
December of 1919, and transferred back into the army in August of 1935. He was 
brought to Trent Park in September of 1944. In March of 1944, he was described 
by his superior as “one of our best.” The CSDIC (UK) noted that he “supported 
Nazis some years, although never [was] a Party member” and that though he 
found some fault with the regime he would not get involved with spreading this 
idea among the German people. His oldest son, Oberleutnant zur See Heinz 
Eugen Eberbach, followed his father’s footsteps, joined the army in August of 
1939 and was held at Trent Park from September to November of 1944 (Neitzel 
288-289). 
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regards	  to	  his	  visit	  to	  a	  concentration	  camp	  (Von	  Lang	  76).	  	  I	  believe	  that	  this	  claim	  of	  disgust	  with	  the	  way	  the	  Jews	  were	  being	  treated	  and	  murdered	  is	  a	  less	  direct	  but	  still	  relevant	  appeal	  to	  the	  topos	  of	  ‘things	  should	  have	  been	  done	  differently.’	  Eichmann	  used	  this	  topos	  throughout	  his	  interrogations	  and	  it	  comes	  across	  as	  fairly	  sincere.	  I	  believe	  that	  he	  was	  disgusted	  by	  the	  things	  he	  saw,	  but	  I	  also	  do	  not	  believe	  he	  was	  against	  the	  extermination.	  In	  regards	  to	  his	  visit	  to	  Auschwitz,	  Eichmann	  made	  the	  claim,	  “I	  never	  got	  any	  further	  than	  the	  command	  post	  at	  the	  main	  entrance”	  (Von	  Lang	  83).	  Eichmann	  does	  not	  say	  here	  or	  anywhere	  that	  the	  genocide	  should	  not	  have	  happened.	  He	  does	  not	  claim	  that	  this	  idea	  of	  the	  “Jewish	  problem”	  did	  not	  require	  a	  solution;	  he	  only	  indirectly	  indicates	  that	  he	  doesn’t	  think	  it	  should’ve	  been	  done	  in	  that	  way.	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CONCLUSION	  	  	   Evidence	  of	  all	  five	  of	  O’Shaughnessy	  and	  Kershaw’s	  hypothesized	  topoi	  common	  to	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  private	  forum	  of	  the	  captured	  generals	  at	  Trent	  Park.	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  major	  difference	  in	  the	  strength	  of	  each	  of	  these	  especially	  when	  their	  use	  or	  non-­‐use	  by	  Eichmann	  is	  taken	  into	  consideration.	  	  	   When	  it	  came	  to	  testing	  the	  hypothetical	  topoi	  O’Shaughnessy	  and	  Kershaw	  presented,	  compartmentalization,	  or	  the	  ability	  live	  in	  multiple	  separate	  worlds	  with	  different	  moral	  codes,	  showed	  a	  strong	  correlation	  to	  both	  the	  public	  and	  private	  end-­‐of-­‐war/post-­‐war	  deliberations	  of	  Hitler’s	  generals,	  but	  not	  the	  strongest.	  We	  can	  see	  this	  correlation	  in	  the	  generals’	  and	  Eichmann’s	  justifying	  statements	  that	  they	  were	  “just	  following	  orders,”	  but	  there	  is	  too	  strong	  an	  incentive	  to	  make	  such	  an	  argument	  when	  trying	  to	  justify	  one’s	  actions	  as	  evidenced	  throughout	  history	  for	  this	  correlation	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  Hitler	  himself.	  	   The	  second	  hypothesis	  we	  were	  testing	  was	  that	  of	  O’Shaughnessy’s	  perceived	  existential	  threat.	  This	  topos	  has	  a	  less	  strong	  correlation	  to	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  these	  generals.	  Like	  compartmentalizaiton,	  perceived	  existential	  threat	  was	  born	  out	  of	  a	  common	  cultural	  idea	  so	  much	  so	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  tell	  whether	  the	  evidence	  of	  the	  topos	  in	  the	  Trent	  Park	  generals	  is	  a	  result	  of	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  or	  the	  culture	  itself.	  However,	  the	  topos	  was	  too	  strongly	  correlated	  with	  the	  ideas	  of	  the	  Nazi	  party	  for	  us	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  any	  overarching	  claims.	  Though	  we	  see	  much	  of	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this	  topos	  in	  the	  captured	  generals	  at	  Trent	  Park,	  we	  do	  not	  see	  it	  in	  Eichmann’s	  interrogation.	  Eichmann	  faces	  too	  strong	  an	  incentive	  to	  deny	  this	  topos;	  therefore,	  we	  cannot	  make	  any	  strong	  claims	  as	  to	  the	  overall	  strength	  of	  its	  correlation	  to	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  between	  both	  the	  private	  and	  public	  setting.	  	  	   The	  next	  hypothesis	  we	  looked	  at	  was	  what	  O’Shaughnessy	  referred	  to	  as	  opportunism.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  two	  of	  Hitler’s	  topos	  most	  strongly	  correlated	  with	  the	  end-­‐of-­‐war/post-­‐war	  rhetoric	  of	  his	  generals.	  This	  topos	  is	  seen	  in	  the	  Trent	  Park	  generals	  very	  clearly	  and	  directly	  through	  their	  discussions	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  they	  felt	  the	  war	  was	  justified	  in	  the	  first	  place	  and	  through	  a	  correlation	  of	  those	  who	  saw	  the	  war	  as	  lost	  also	  being	  those	  with	  more	  anti-­‐Nazi	  rhetoric.	  In	  the	  public	  setting	  of	  Eichmann’s	  trial,	  we	  don’t	  see	  Eichmann	  talk	  about	  Germany	  as	  a	  victim	  of	  WWI	  as	  we	  do	  with	  the	  captured	  generals,	  but	  we	  do	  see	  Eichmann	  claim	  that	  he	  is	  not	  an	  anti-­‐semite.	  This	  is	  evidence	  of	  Eichmann’s	  utilization	  of	  opportunism	  because	  we	  know	  he	  was	  a	  fierce	  anti-­‐semite,	  and	  thus	  we	  can	  infer	  that	  his	  decision	  not	  to	  expose	  his	  belief	  now	  that	  Nazism	  and	  the	  attached	  antisemitism	  are	  condemned	  as	  an	  act	  of	  opportunism.	  	  	   The	  fourth	  hypothesis	  of	  O’Shaughnessy	  is	  that	  of	  Charisma.	  This	  aspect	  of	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  can	  be	  seen	  very	  strongly	  in	  the	  private	  setting,	  but	  some	  of	  these	  generals	  also	  discuss	  strong	  evidence	  to	  the	  contrary.	  In	  the	  public	  setting,	  Eichmann	  does	  not	  mention	  Hitler’s	  claimed	  charisma.	  Thus,	  this	  topos,	  though	  not	  entirely	  invalid,	  seems	  to	  show	  a	  much	  weaker	  correlation	  to	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  Hitler’s	  generals	  than	  the	  previous	  topoi	  do.	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   Finally,	  Kershaw’s	  proposed	  topos	  of	  propaganda	  of	  the	  deed	  that	  is	  found	  in	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric,	  has	  a	  very	  strong	  correlational	  strength	  to	  Hitler’s	  generals	  rhetoric.	  This	  is	  a	  topoi	  that	  was	  based	  in	  a	  common	  cultural	  belief	  and	  weaponized	  by	  Hitler.	  We	  see	  strong	  evidence	  of	  this	  topos	  in	  the	  Trent	  Park	  generals	  and	  we	  see	  evidence	  of	  Eichmann	  utilizing	  this	  topos	  as	  well.	  The	  Trent	  Park	  generals	  and	  Eichmann	  both	  make	  strong	  claims	  as	  to	  the	  initial	  goals	  and	  appeal	  of	  solving	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  problems	  they	  faced.	  Therefore,	  this	  topos	  is	  the	  second	  of	  the	  two	  most	  strongly	  correlated	  topoi.	  	   There	  is	  evidence	  in	  these	  end-­‐of-­‐war/post-­‐war	  deliberations,	  both	  public	  and	  private	  to	  support	  O’Shaughnessy	  and	  Kershaw’s	  topoi	  to	  different	  extents,	  but	  we	  see	  the	  strongest	  correlation	  between	  Hitler’s	  and	  the	  generals’	  rhetoric	  in	  topoi	  that	  have	  a	  basis	  in	  common	  cultural	  beliefs.	  These	  two	  topoi	  of	  propaganda	  of	  the	  deed	  and	  opportunism	  are	  both	  strategies	  that	  utilize	  previously	  held	  beliefs	  in	  the	  population	  and	  leverage	  them.	  We	  cannot	  say	  whether	  any	  of	  these	  correlations	  between	  Hitler	  and	  his	  generals’	  rhetoric	  are	  a	  result	  of	  Hitler’s	  own	  persuasive	  power	  or	  are	  purely	  a	  result	  of	  cultural	  phenomena.	  Causation	  is	  too	  complex	  to	  determine	  by	  examining	  this	  historical	  data	  for	  rhetorical	  evidence.	  We	  cannot	  make	  a	  claim	  that	  Hitler	  changed	  the	  minds	  of	  people,	  rather	  it	  seems	  that	  those	  who	  were	  predisposed	  to	  believe	  the	  basis	  of	  these	  arguments	  were	  those	  most	  affected	  by	  his	  rhetoric.	  	   The	  fact	  that	  we	  see	  less	  evidence	  of	  this	  rhetorical	  influence	  in	  the	  private	  setting	  is	  complex.	  Not	  only	  do	  we	  deal	  with	  the	  aspects	  of	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Reich’s	  arguments	  that	  are	  relatable	  to	  a	  single	  person,	  but	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  what	  will	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benefit	  this	  man	  as	  he	  attempts	  to	  save	  his	  own	  life.	  He	  must	  be	  very	  cautious	  as	  to	  what	  he	  admits	  to	  agreeing	  with,	  being	  influenced	  by,	  etc.,	  which	  is	  not	  necessarily	  going	  to	  be	  indicative	  of	  his	  entire	  catalog	  of	  	  influences.	  The	  rhetorical	  decisions	  he	  makes	  are	  going	  to	  be	  very	  selective	  and	  self-­‐serving.	  They	  will	  lean	  more	  on	  the	  side	  of	  caution	  than	  of	  truth	  and	  thus	  give	  us	  evidence	  of	  something	  that	  doesn't	  necessarily	  show	  whether	  or	  not	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  was	  successful	  or	  not,	  but	  rather	  tells	  us	  much	  more	  about	  the	  environment	  and	  opinions	  of	  those	  being	  tried	  and	  those	  holding	  the	  trial	  of	  Adolf	  Eichmann.	  It	  tells	  us	  what	  Eichmann	  thought	  would	  benefit	  him	  and	  what	  he	  thought	  would	  incriminate	  him.	  It	  reveals	  to	  us	  evidence	  of	  what	  he	  may	  have	  potentially	  found	  to	  be	  irredeemable	  qualities	  of	  the	  Reich’s	  rhetoric	  that	  would	  prevent	  him	  from	  going	  free.	  	  I	  think	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  enough	  correlation	  of	  the	  proposed	  rhetoric	  of	  Hitler	  and	  that	  of	  his	  generals	  to	  suggest	  that,	  at	  some	  level,	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric	  did	  have	  an	  influence	  on	  the	  way	  these	  generals	  created	  their	  alibis.	  However,	  I’m	  not	  convinced	  that	  there	  is	  enough	  evidence	  to	  conclusively	  prove	  that	  this	  was	  a	  real	  rather	  than	  apparent	  influence.	  There	  is	  no	  way	  to	  prove	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  rhetorical	  evidence	  itself	  is	  indicative	  of	  a	  larger	  true	  influence	  of	  Hitler’s	  ideas	  on	  his	  generals,	  but	  the	  repetition	  of	  rhetoric	  in	  both	  the	  private	  and	  public	  deliberations	  itself	  does	  suggest,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  a	  cultural	  influence	  and	  creation	  of	  a	  selection	  of	  talking	  points	  from	  which	  those	  who	  were	  searching	  for	  explanations	  of	  their	  own	  motivations	  whether	  for	  themselves	  or	  	  in	  the	  public	  eye	  were	  able	  to	  pick	  and	  choose	  at	  their	  own	  discretion.	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